There is growing operational awareness of the challenges in securely operating IPv6 networks. Through a measurement study of 520,000 dual-stack servers and 25,000 dual-stack routers, we examine the extent to which security policy codified in IPv4 has also been deployed in IPv6. We find several high-value target applications with a comparatively open security policy in IPv6 including: (i) SSH, Telnet, SNMP, are more than twice as open on routers in IPv6 as they are in IPv4; (ii) nearly half of routers with BGP open were only open in IPv6; and (iii) in the server dataset, SNMP was twice as open in IPv6 as in IPv4. We conduct a detailed study of where port blocking policy is being applied and find that protocol openness discrepancies are consistent within network boundaries, suggesting a systemic failure in organizations to deploy consistent security policy. We successfully communicate our findings with twelve network operators and all twelve confirm that the relative openness was unintentional. Ten of the twelve immediately moved to deploy a congruent IPv6 security policy, reflecting real operational concern. Finally, we revisit the belief that the security impact of this comparative openness in IPv6 is mitigated by the infeasibility of IPv6 network-wide scanning-we find that, for both of our datasets, host addressing practices make discovering these high-value hosts feasible by scanning alone. To help operators accurately measure their own IPv6 security posture, we make our probing system publicly available. Permission to freely reproduce all or part of this paper for noncommercial purposes is granted provided that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Reproduction for commercial purposes is strictly prohibited without the prior written consent of the Internet Society, the first-named author (for reproduction of an entire paper only), and the author's employer if the paper was prepared within the scope of employment.

After several IPv4 address exhaustion milestones in the last three years, it is becoming apparent that the world is running out of IPv4 addresses, and the adoption of the next generation Internet protocol, IPv6, though nascent, is accelerating. In order to better understand this unique and disruptive transition, we explore twelve metrics using ten global-scale datasets to create the longest and broadest measurement of IPv6 adoption to date. Using this perspective, we find that adoption, relative to IPv4, varies by two orders of magnitude depending on the measure examined and that care must be taken when evaluating adoption metrics in isolation. Further, we find that regional adoption is not uniform. Finally, and perhaps most surprisingly, we find that over the last three years, the nature of IPv6 utilization-in terms of traffic, content, reliance on transition technology, and performance-has shifted dramatically from prior findings, indicating a maturing of the protocol into production mode. We believe IPv6's recent growth and this changing utilization signal a true quantum leap.

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks based on Network Time Protocol (NTP) amplification, which became prominent in December 2013, have received significant global attention. We chronicle how this attack rapidly rose from obscurity to become the dominant large DDoS vector. Via the lens of five distinct datasets, we characterize the advent and evolution of these attacks. Through a dataset that measures a large fraction of global Internet traffic, we show a three order of magnitude rise in NTP. Using a large darknet, we observe a similar rise in global scanning activity, both malicious and research. We then dissect an active probing dataset, which reveals that the pool of amplifiers totaled 2.2M unique IPs and includes a small number of "mega amplifiers," servers that replied to a single tiny probe packet with gigabytes of data. This dataset also allows us, for the first time, to analyze global DDoS attack victims (including ports attacked) and incidents, where we show 437K unique IPs targeted with at least 3 trillion packets, totaling more than a petabyte. Finally, ISP datasets shed light on the local impact of these attacks. In aggregate, we show the magnitude of this major Internet threat, the community's response, and the effect of that response.

We report the results of a study to collect and analyze IPv6 Internet background radiation. This study, the largest of its kind, collects unclaimed traffic on the IPv6 Internet by announcing five large /12 covering prefixes; these cover the majority of allocated IPv6 space on today's Internet. Our analysis characterizes the nature of this traffic across regions, over time, and by the allocation and routing status of the intended destinations, which we show help to identify the causes of this traffic. We compare results to unclaimed traffic in IPv4, and highlight case studies that explain a large fraction of the data or highlight notable properties. We describe how announced covering prefixes differ from traditional network telescopes, and show how this technique can help both network operators and the research community identify additional potential issues and misconfigurations in this critical Internet transition period.

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