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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Foreign Policy. fter nearly a year of fragile peace, Bosnia andHerzegovina remains a deeply depressing place, awash in bitterness and unresolved grievances. While the country's Serb, Croat, and Bosniac (or Muslim) communities are exhausted from fighting, their nationalist leaderships remain fundamentally at odds over the terms and conditions of multiethnic coexistence. Thanks to the Dayton accord, their struggles are now largely nonviolent, yet the resulting gridlock illustrates just how far Bosnia's realities diverge from the lofty goals established in the agreement.Peace settlements, by their very nature, often propel war-torn countries into fits of manic-depression. First comes the euphoria generated by the agreement itself. Large influxes of peacekeepers induce stability and buoy the local economy. Then, slowly, psychological deflation sets in. Common crime soars as the disengagement of armies creates a vacuum that bandits are quick to fill. Unhappy constituencies such as ex-soldiers, the wounded, and displaced populations become more obstreperous. Multiparty elections spawn tensions. An overabundance of weapons increases the lethality of civil violence, while land mines reduce freedom of movement and economic development. Reconstruction lags behind expectations. Peacekeepers begin to look like occupiers.

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