No abstract

While many studies have suggested or assumed that the periods preceding the onset of intra-state conflict are similar across time and space, few have empirically tested this proposition. Using the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System's domestic event data in Asia from 1998–2010, we subject this proposition to empirical analysis. We code the similarity of government-rebel interactions in sequences preceding the onset of intra-state conflict to those preceding further periods of peace using three different metrics: Euclidean, Levenshtein, and mutual information. These scores are then used as predictors in a bivariate logistic regression to forecast whether we are likely to observe conflict in neither, one, or both of the states. We find that our model accurately classifies cases where both sequences precede peace, but struggles to distinguish between cases in which one sequence escalates to conflict and where both sequences escalate to conflict. These findings empirically suggest that generalizable patterns exist between event sequences that precede peace.

Abstract

Roundtable Discussion on Event Data Ersel Aydınlı: It seems like I have all the microphones, but that doesn't mean that I will do all the talking! We have only one question, in light of yesterday's presentations and discussions that I think we have to respond to here today: how do we really apply event data to Turkish foreign affairs and foreign policy, security affairs and Turkish IR? With the help of everybody here, Turkish scholars and our international guests, we would like to spend this opportunity looking for some suggestions to respond to this. We have of course technical issues, event data related issues, as well as topical or subject-matter related issues-Turkish foreign affairs, foreign policy, and so on. Would anybody like to go first? Özgür Özdamar: (Bilkent University) I would like to start out by saying thanks to the organizers because this has been a great conference for all of us to both learn about event data and also to think about future projects involving Turkish Foreign Policy. We were asked to prepare a bit for this workshop, so while I was reading articles about event data, I began thinking about how we can apply this to Turkish Foreign Policy studies. These are just the first things that came to my mind and they are very crude ideas, but I think I could categorize them in two ways: The first would be more a test of the event data methodology itself and the other would be about looking at the past of substantive issues concerning Turkish Foreign Policy by using event data. Another thing that came to my mind is that of a more descriptive study of Turkey's foreign relations by using event data. For example, using event data to understand such questions as who are we in contact with the most and in what ways, or who are we in cooperation with the most, or what kind of conflictual relations do we have the most? Even that kind of a simple descriptive study, as far as I know, has not been done here. Moreover, there are some substantial questions concerning Turkish Foreign Policy and I think that event data can help us understand them. One of them, for example, is the much debated Davutoğlu foreign policy, whether it has decreased cooperation among neighbors or not. The argument often goes that since 2002, both the AKP foreign policy and the current Foreign Minister, Davutoğlu's foreign policy has decreased the cooperation with Turkey's neighbors. The countering argument is that it increased cooperation with neighbors compared to before, but there is no test using this type of data. Finally, the other thing that comes to my mind is, as we debated a lot in the last maybe three or four years is what we call in Turkish the "Eksen Kaymasi," or basically, axis shift. The question is whether Turkish Foreign Policy is shifting its axis from pro-Western to pro-Eastern. It seems like so many scholars feel like they have to pick a side. But if you use a methodology like event data, if you rely on hard data, you can really understand whether Turkish foreign policy is indeed changing its direction or is it th...