Traininp in pycholoa onphasires the scientific method as the hacis frrr knmulerlge claim h u t rhought and behavior. Students are re,~larly rvaluoted in toms of their masreq of methodological and statistical fmnciples, but little attention has heen paid to assessinfi the dEgree to which students endorse the notion that psycho lo^ is, indeed, a science. Several studies are r e w e d thar validate a selfireport measure of this construct. The psycho lo^ as Science Scale is shaun to be a reliable measure that predicts a range of conslruct-releuant atticudid and eerfonnance criteria. Possible research ues of h e measure, as well as broader issues suwoundiirp the general tmhlic's epistemolo@cal assrunp tiim conceminfi laychology, are discucsed.Psychology occupies a unique position as a discipline. addressing basic questions of meaning and value nonnally associated with the humanities hut approaching the study of thought and behavior from the methodological perspective of ihc natunl sciences. Whether psychologists' work focuses on basic knowledge acquisition and theory development or on prohlem solution through behavioral technolow, psychologists are distinguished from other professionals by their systematic grounding in the sciencc of hchavior (Fishman & Neigher, 1982). This grounding in the scientific method is reinforced in virtually every undergraduate psychology course, with topics in research dcsign and the logic of science most oftenaddressed in theearliestchaptersofstandard texts. Councs in methodology and sratistics are among the Few clnrscs recom~nendcd as requirements across nll thematic variations of the undergmduate psychology major (McGovem, Furunloto, Halpem, Kimhle, & McKeacliie, 1991).Given the prominent rolc thar the scientific m e t h d plays in psycholq:y, it is unsurprising that teachers routincly ev:ilu;lte the extent to which students underst;md scientific Icgic and thesuhtletiesof rese;rrchdesign and analysis. What is surprising, however, is tlvat so little attention is paid to assesing whether students believe in what is heing caught. S~udcnrs may dutifi~lly master suchcmtent as t11ediiTerences hetwecn truc experiments ;md correlational J c s i p s or the reasoning hchind the use of placeho treatments, hut they [nay l~i l to perceive psychology as a tndy scicntific enterpriseinaeail hehaving as if informal observation and common sense prn\~idnd atlequate rests of psychological truth claims.Perceiving Psychology as a Science we rcally need to hc so conccmed with people's lwlicfs ;ihout the scientific nature of psychology! Even professionals within the field are not entircly in agrcemcnt on psychology'sstatus. Kimble (1984) discussed psychology's "two cultures," documenting a scientist-humanist split within the field concerning issues such as behavioral determinism and systematic observation versus intuition as sources of basic knowledge. Korn (1985) lamented psychologists' tendency, in their preoccupation with scientific methodology, to ignore alternative ways of understanding human naturc drawn...

A broad empirical literature demonstrates what has been termed a confirmation bias or positive test strategy heuristic in reasoning (Klayman & Ha, 1987), a potentially maladaptive pattern of data preferences that coexists with more normative preferences for highly diagnostic information (Skov & Sherman, 1986). A model is developed to account for these variations in test strategies, beginning with the premise that cognitive processes are adapted to reducing particularly costly errors rather than to detecting "truth" (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). By specifying the information required to minimize various errors of primary concern, the model clarifies the adaptiveness of certain confirmatory preferences, identifies conditions under which such preferences should diminish, and outlines how error minimization goals might produce data preferences coincidentally consistent with normative prescriptions.

Costly life‐saving interventions can often be described not only in terms of the number of lives that may be saved but also in terms of the proportion of lives saved out of some total number at risk. In a phenomenon that has been referred to as psychophysical numbing (PN), Fetherstonhaugh, Slovic, Johnson, and Friedrich (1997) found that participants rated an intervention saving a fixed number of lives to be less worth investing in when more total lives were at risk (i.e., when saved lives represented a smaller proportion of the total threat or problem). In two new experiments, life‐valuation correlates of PN responding, as well as manipulations of death salience, accountability, and economics focus, were explored in the context of students’ willingness to support mandatory antilock brake requirements for new cars. PN responding was pervasive, but non‐PN responders were clearly distinguished by the greater overall value they placed on saving lives. Salience and accountability manipulations did not debias judgments but did tend to rule out low‐effort processing as an explanation for these quantity confusions. An emphasis on economic considerations was consistently related to greater PN responding.

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