<p>This thesis investigates Trading in Influence in the Aotearoa New Zealand context and examines how potentially corrupt behaviours have been normalised in New Zealand. The thesis draws on the long history of corruption studies, in particular the dynamic tension between approaches that look at illegal corrupt acts, and broader approaches of ‘legal' corruption, which is viewed as an endemic and systematic issue. From this literature, the thesis focuses on the definition of Trading in Influence Johnston (2005) describes, with reference to the relevant clauses in The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), although not using the convention’s definition directly. The thesis utilises two key theoretical frameworks: Johnson’s (2005) Influence Markets framework, and Ashford and Anand’s (2003) Normalisation framework that has until now only been applied to organisational corruption studies. The empirical component of the thesis consists of two interlinked sets of data. First, two paradigmatic case studies are examined: the Jami-Lee Ross donations scandal and the New Zealand First Foundation donations scandal. The events are thematically analysed against the Trading in Influence framework, alongside a narrative of media coverage and discourse related to the cases. Second, a series of interviews with individuals involved with government relations and the political system are analysed thematically with particular attention paid to the language and rationales used, as well as the specific behaviours discussed by participants. These two data sets are triangulated to the literature, with three key findings:(1) Trading in Influence is a nascent problem in New Zealand; (2) Trading in Influence has been normalised in a number of key ways, including appeals to legality and the casualisation of influential relationships; (3) the New Zealand experience can help us refine the Normalisation framework for future studies. The thesis concludes by contextualising the manifestation of the syndrome in Aotearoa New Zealand, pointing towards other aspects which may need to be controlled and researched. Thus, this thesis offers a contribution not only to studies on corruption in Aotearoa New Zealand, but also a theoretical contribution to the causes of Trading in Influence, and the Normalisation of legal corrupt behaviour.</p>

Michael Kia ora, James, what troubles you? James Kia ora, Michael. Nothing is troubling me, my friend, on a personal level; I'm just deep in thought about our commitment to anti-corruption. M.M. Ah, yes-I think about that frequently too. In fact I think about how great our fine country is in that respect. Number one in the Corruption Perception Index, admittedly alongside those admirable Danes; 1 number one in the World Bank's good-governance measures for control of corruption; known throughout the world as a land of high trust and high integrity. J.G. We are, indeed, and I certainly wouldn't argue against that. But it's not really that straightforward, is it? M.M. Well, nothing is ever entirely straightforward, of course, but in this respect it is surely clear, isn't it? J.G. But is it? Tell me, my friend, why is it that so many people consider that we lack leadership in the very field in which we are so widely praised? M.M. I'm not so sure that we do, but I'll take that assumption and offer a logical explanation. It's not that NZ doesn't demonstrate leadership; we are simply a humble and modest people. We don't feel the need to crow about our achievements in integrity. There's not much more to it than that. J.G. Perhaps you're correct, but that can't be the only potential explanation, can it? M.M. Now you have me at a loss. Perhaps it would be better to tell me your ideas rather than interrogate me. J.G. Very well, I'll do just that. Your view may well be correct, although it would require that shared national characteristics are a real thing, which is debatable, to say the least. But there are many other possible reasons. It may also be that we feel that our work in this field is done…

In November 2015 the Organised Crime and Anti-corruption Legislation Bill was passed by Parliament. An omnibus bill, it amended numerous different acts in relation to (among other things) money laundering, organised crime, corruption and bribery offences. One of its stated aims was to bring New Zealand legislation up to date to enable New Zealand to finally ratify the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which it did in December that year. The merits and potential demerits of the bill have been discussed previously (Macaulay and Gregory, 2015), but one thing that requires further attention is the creation of a new offence of ‘trading in influence’.