TOC Summary: This method is time and labor efficient and minimizes potential risk for virus aerosolization.

No abstract

Vaccines are used in integrated control strategies to protect poultry against H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI). H5N1 HPAI was first reported in Indonesia in IMPORTANCEH5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) virus has become endemic in Indonesian poultry, and such poultry are the source of virus for birds and mammals, including humans. Vaccination has become a part of the poultry control strategy, but vaccine failures have occurred in the field. This study identified possible causes of vaccine failure, which included the use of an unlicensed virus seed strain and induction of low levels of protective antibody because of an insufficient quantity of vaccine antigen. However, the most important cause of vaccine failure was the appearance of drift variant field viruses that partially or completely overcame commercial vaccine-induced immunity. Furthermore, experimental vaccines using inactivated wild-type virus or reverse genetics-generated vaccines containing the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase genes of wild-type drift variant field viruses were protective. These studies indicate the need for surveillance to identify drift variant viruses in the field and update licensed vaccines when such variants appear.

Background: Rodent models of orofacial pain typically use methods adapted from manipulations to hind paw; however, limitations of these models include animal restraint and subjective assessments of behavior by the experimenter. In contrast to these methods, assessment of operant responses to painful stimuli has been shown to overcome these limitations and expand the breadth of interpretation of the behavioral responses. In the current study, we used an operant model based on a reward-conflict paradigm to assess nociceptive responses in three strains of mice (SKH1-Hr hr , C57BL/6J, TRPV1 knockout). We previously validated this operant model in rats and hypothesized in this study that wildtype mice would demonstrate a similar thermal stimulus-dependent response and similar operant pain behaviors. Additionally, we evaluated the effects on operant behaviors of mice manipulated genetically (e.g., TRPV1 k.o.) or pharmacologically with resiniferatoxin (RTX), a lesioning agent for TRPV1-expressing neurons. During the rewardconflict task, mice accessed a sweetened milk reward solution by voluntarily position their face against a neutral or heated thermode (37-55°C).

Outbreaks from choir performances, such as the Skagit Valley Choir, showed that singing brings potential risk of COVID-19 infection. There is less known about the risks of airborne infection from other musical performances, such as playing wind instruments or performing theater. In addition, it is important to understand methods that can be used to reduce infection risk. In this study, we used a variety of methods, including flow visualization, aerosol and CO 2 measurements, and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling to understand the different components that can lead to transmission risk from musical performance and risk mitigation. This study was possible because of a partnership across academic departments and institutions and collaboration with the National Federation of State High School Associations and the College Band Directors National Association. The interdisciplinary team enabled us to understand the various aspects of aerosol transmission risk from musical performance and to quickly implement strategies in music classrooms during the COVID-19 pandemic. We found that plumes from musical performance were highly directional, unsteady and varied considerably in time and space. Aerosol number concentration measured at the bell of the clarinet was comparable to that of singing. Face and bell masks attenuated plume velocities and lengths and decreased aerosol concentrations measured in front of the masks. CFD modeling showed differences between indoor and outdoor environments and that the lowest risk of airborne COVID-19 infection occurred at less than 30 min of exposure indoors and less than 60 min outdoors.