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Marketing agreements between meatpacking and cattle feeding firms have created concerns about their effects on fed cattle prices. Profit-sharing marketing agreements were imposed onto a simulated fed cattle market. Price level and variability differences with and without agreements, between agreement participants and nonparticipants, during agreement and nonagreement periods, and between participants receiving and not receiving a monetary incentive were evaluated. Prices and variability for nonagreement cattle were higher during the agreement periods. Marketing agreement participants realized lower, less variable prices than nonparticipating firms. Monetary incentives did not affect price levels but increased price variability. Copyright 1999, Oxford University Press.

A feeder-calf price model is estimated which incorporates elements of break-even budget analysis, including estimates of placement weights, slaughter weights, ration cost, and feed-conversion rates. From this model, a corn price multiplier is calculated which quantifies the corn/feeder-calf price relationship. Because the multiplier includes information on cattle weight, feed conversion, and ration cost, it also provides insight into how feeding programs are altered in response to corn price changes. Changes in feeding programs which occur in response to corn price changes are illustrated with dynamic simulation based on weight, ration cost, and price models presented here.

Variable beef-breeding herd sizes are found to be optimal given cyclical beef prices. Traditional replacement theory does not allow variable firm size because unequal investment (replacement) and disinvestment (culling) rates are not possible. If firm size changes, cost of production per unit endogenously changes given a u-shaped cost curve. Optimal investment and disinvestment rules for variable firm size are developed based upon the firm's cost curve and discounted net revenue flows for a finite rolling planning horizon. Current and future investment and disinvestment decisions are linked by their mutual effect on firm size and hence production cost per unit.

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