Path dependency emerged as a theoretical approach in the social sciences (specifically economics) in the 1980s, and has gradually been applied with greater frequency in political science. As a form of historical institutionalism, it shows promise of casting significant light on processes of political stability and change. The present study examines several large-scale defining traits of Russian politics and governance from the perspective of historical path dependence: to date, most applications of path-dependency theory to Russian studies have focused more on economics than politics and governance per se. This essay applies core ideas in path dependency theory to the case of Russia in the early twenty-first century, focusing on significant political traits that emerged during the Putin and Medvedev presidencies. This study proceeds from the view that politics revolves fundamentally around three core axes: identity, interests, and institutions; every aspect of political life, arguably, falls under one or more of these dimensions and all show path-dependent tendencies. The traits of Russian governance that show evidence of pathdependent self-replication include: (1) tendencies toward monocratic manifestations of political power; (2) political authority being conceived and exercised in neo-autocratic modes that deliberately control, marginalize, or patently exclude broad and efficacious participatory democracy; (3) an apparently instinctive trend toward political centralization; and (4) a tendency to vacillate historically between a weak and strong state, with powerful historical impulses toward the latter. By applying core ideas in pathdependency theory to the case of Russian politics in the early twenty-first century, our understanding is deepened.

The basis of a civil nation is common goals, common values, trust in the government, and the understanding that the government serves us. The main task of the people [now] is to avoid military service, taxes, and the authorities in general. Under such conditions, it is impossible to form a civil political nation. 1In 2004, before the grotesque tragedy of the Beslan school hostage massacre had materialized, Shireen Hunter offered the following trenchant commentary on the highly complex and fluid situation of religion and national identity in Russia, particularly regarding Russia's multi-religious and multinational character:The challenge for Russia, a multiethnic and multireligious entity, is how to ensure that the reassertion of Russianness and the affirmation of the Russian culture and identity will not be at the expense of other major ethnic and cultural groups, notably the Muslims. Failure to reconcile the competing claims of its diverse people for self-determination within a broad and all-encompassing civic Russian identity, encompassing loyalty to the Russian state after a period of reawakening and reassertion of ethnic, cultural, and religious peculiarities and efforts to achieve greater selfdetermination, could presage continuous interethnic strife and the strengthening of nondemocratic forces. Such a development could set back Russia's development and modernization-economic, social, and political-and possibly endanger Russia's stability. 2

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Turkey was established as a secular republic in 1923, and was the first predominantly Moslem country to formally do so; significantly, the Turkish population is overwhelmingly Sunni Moslem regarding formal religious identification. The meaning of "secular republic" has varied over time, however, and has certainly varied in interpretation by the relevant actors in Turkish political life, including popular perceptions of what secularism should mean. The word itself is ambiguous and may carry a wide array of meanings; the Turkish word, laiklik 1 is as intrinsically ambiguous as its