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This paper surveys some ways of distinguishing Quasi-Realism in metaethics (and I hope also in other areas) from Non-naturalist Realism, including ‘Explanationist’ methods of distinguishing, which characterize the Real by its explanatory role, and Inferentialist methods. Rather than seeking the One True Distinction, the paper adopts an irenic and pragmatist perspective, allowing that different ways of drawing the line are best for different purposes.

This chapter deals with the concept “world-centered value” which seems to be a natural extension of some concepts that already exist in ethical theory and also seems useful for understanding some confusing ideas (about the representation of prohibition dilemmas or about apparent failures of transitivity of “better than”) in the work of other philosophers. The chapter explains that concept and employs it to explicate the confusing ideas. If the concept makes sense, and if it can be useful in understanding the ideas by placing them in the consequentialist framework, then world-centered value earns its keep and should find a place next to agent-centered and time-centered value in the ethical theorist’s toolbox.

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