As is common across the public sector, the UK police service is under pressure to do more with less, to target resources more efficiently and take steps to identify threats proactively; for example under riskassessment schemes such as 'Clare's Law' and 'Sarah's Law'. Algorithmic tools promise to improve a police force's decisionmaking and prediction abilities by making better use of data (including intelligence), both from inside and outside the force. This article uses Durham Constabulary's Harm Assessment Risk Tool (HART) as a case-study. HART is one of the first algorithmic models to be deployed by a UK police force in an operational capacity. Our article comments upon the potential benefits of such tools, explains the concept and method of HART and considers the results of the first validation of the model's use and accuracy. The article then critiques the use of algorithmic tools within policing from a societal and legal perspective, focusing in particular upon substantive common law grounds for judicial review. It considers a concept of 'experimental' proportionality to permit the use of unproven algorithms in the public sector in a controlled and time-limited way, and as part of a combination of approaches to combat algorithmic opacity, proposes 'ALGO-CARE', a guidance framework of some of the key legal and practical concerns that should be considered in relation to the use of algorithmic risk assessment tools by the police. The article concludes that for the use of algorithmic tools in a policing context to result in a 'better' outcome, that is to say, a more efficient use of police resources in a landscape of more consistent, evidence-based decision-making, then an 'experimental' proportionality approach should be developed to ensure that new solutions from 'big data' can be found for criminal justice problems traditionally arising from clouded, non-augmented decision-making. Finally, this article notes that there is a subset of decisions around which there is too great an impact upon society and upon the welfare of individuals for them to be influenced by an emerging technology; to an extent, in fact, that they should be removed from the influence of algorithmic decision-making altogether.

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Before disclosing confidential patient information for purposes not directly related to his or her care and treatment, there is currently a responsibility upon health professionals to consult with a patient wherever practicable. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 has diluted that responsibility to consult, at least in relation to any information that the Health and Social Care Information Centre requires health professionals to disclose. This is at odds with other moves to support an individual's involvement in decisions that affect them. Moreover, a responsibility to consult can be shown to be a procedural aspect of the fundamental right to respect for private and family life as guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The scope and nature of a procedural requirement for consultation can be revealed, at least in part, by considering the case law concerning disclosure in the field of criminality information sharing. If the Health and Social Care Act 2012 is to be adequately protected from a challenge for incompatibility with the ECHR, then practicable opportunities to provide information about the intended purposes of processing, and respect for any reasonable objection to disclosure, must be recognised beyond those explicitly provided for by the 2012 Act. The Code of Practice that the Information Centre is responsible for producing represents an opportunity to guarantee adequate levels of consultation will be preserved, consistent with proposed changes to the NHS Constitution.

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