A key feature of most social relationships is that we like seeing good things happen to others. Research has implicated the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in attaching value to social outcomes. For example, single neurons in macaque ACC selectively code reward delivery to the self, a partner, both monkeys, or neither monkey. Here, we assessed whether the ACC's contribution to social cognition is causal by testing rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) on a vicarious reinforcement task before and after they sustained ACC lesions. Prior to surgery, actors learned that 3 different visual cues mapped onto 3 distinct reward outcomes: to self ("Self"), to the other monkey ("Other"), or to neither monkey ("Neither"). On each trial, actors saw a cue that predicted one of the 3 juice offers and could accept the offer by making a saccade to a peripheral target or reject the offer by breaking fixation. Preoperatively, all 6 actors displayed prosocial preferences, indicated by their greater tendency to give reward to Other relative to Neither. Half then received selective, bilateral, excitotoxic lesions of the ACC, and the other half served as unoperated controls. After surgery, all monkeys retained the social preferences they had demonstrated with the preoperatively learned cues, but this preference was reduced in the monkeys with ACC lesions. Critically, none of the monkeys in the ACC lesion group acquired social preferences with a new set of cues introduced after surgery. These data indicate that the primate ACC is necessary for acquisition of prosocial preferences from vicarious reinforcement.

Human Theory of Mind (ToM) is so automatic and pervasive that we spontaneously attribute mental states to animated abstract shapes, as evidenced by the classic Heider–Simmel findings. The extent to which this represents a fundamental characteristic of primate social cognition is debated. Prior research suggests that monkeys spontaneously predict behavior and attribute basic goals to conspecifics, but it remains unclear whether, like humans, they spontaneously ascribe mental states to animated shapes. Here, we address this question by analyzing rhesus monkeys’ viewing patterns of the classic Heider–Simmel animations. We hypothesized that if rhesus monkeys also spontaneously attribute mental states to animated shapes, then, like humans, they would have the longest fixation durations for theory of mind animations, medium duration fixation for goal-directed animations, and shortest fixations for animations with random motion. In contrast, if attributing mental states to animations is specific to humans and perhaps other apes, then we predict no differences in looking time across animation categories. Unlike humans, monkeys did not fixate longer on ToM videos. Critically, monkeys’ viewing patterns did not correlate with humans’ viewing patterns or intentionality ratings from previously published research. The only major difference in viewing patterns between animation categories tracked differences in low-level visual motion. Thus, monkeys do not view the classic Heider–Simmel animations like humans do and we found no evidence that they spontaneously attribute mental states to animated shapes.