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We incorporate trade in tasksà la Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) into a small open economy version of the theory of firm organization of Marin and Verdier (2012) to examine how offshoring affects the way firms organize. We show that the offshoring of production tasks leads firms to reorganize with a more decentralized management, improving the competitiveness of the offshoring firms. We show further that the offshoring of managerial tasks relaxes the constraint on managers but toughens competition, and thus has an ambiguous impact on the level of decentralized management and CEO wages of the offshoring firms. In sufficiently open economies, however, managerial offshoring unambiguously leads to more decentralized management and to larger CEO wages. We test the predictions of the model based on original firm level data we designed and collected of 660 Austrian and German multinational firms with 2200 subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. We find that offshoring firms are 33.4% more decentralized than non-offshoring firms. We find further that the average fraction of managers offshored reduces the level of decentralized management by 3.1%, but increases the level of decentralized management by 4% in industries with a level of openness above the 25th percentile of the openness distribution. Lastly, we find that one additional offshored manager lowers CEO wages relative to workers by 4.9%.

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Objective: Endoscopic extraperitoneal radical prostatectomy (EERPE) and robot-assisted laparoscopic prostatectomy (RALP) are minimally invasive surgical techniques to treat localized prostate cancer. We report the outcome and complications of these two techniques conducted by one individual surgeon. Patients and Methods: 86 patients underwent EERPE between January 2008 and June 2011, and 100 patients underwent RALP between August 2011 and October 2012. All surgeries were performed by one single surgeon. Results: The patients of the EERPE and RALP groups had similar clinical characteristics in PSA, prostate volume and D'Amico classification, and were significantly different in their age and BMI as well as in the number of prior surgeries. RALP surgeries were significantly slower (183 vs. 157 min) but also involved lower blood loss (147 vs. 245 ml). Pathological stages and positive surgical margins were similar in both groups. Complications were assessed by the Clavien-Dindo classification. 6 patients in the EERPE group and 3 patients of the RALP group suffered major complications (IIIb-IV). Conclusion: Altogether our results indicate that the learning curve for RALP was short after experience with EERPE. We hypothesize that this is more a result of the surgical experience of the surgeon with the EERPE than on the robotic technique.

How does the exposure to product market competition affect the investment horizon of firms? We study if firms have an incentive to shift investments toward more short-term assets when exposed to tougher competition. Based on a stylized firm investment model, we derive a within-firm estimator using variation across investments with different durabilities. Exploiting the Chinese World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, we estimate the effects of product market competition on the composition of US firm investments. Firms that experienced tougher competition shifted their expenditures toward investments with a shorter durability. This effect is larger for firms with lower total factor productivity. *