In previous work, we have noted a certain rigidity in sociology's approach to the topic of social relations (Cerulo 1997; Cerulo and Ruane 1997; Cerulo, Ruane, and Chayko 1992). With few exceptions, literature on the subject dichotomizes social relations with reference to the scope of the interaction (small group versus large group) and the mode by which social actors connect (direct connections versus mediated connections). Further, many researchers implicitly rank the social value of each relational form. Sociologists typically identify a society's primary and most valuable relations as the result of direct, physically copresent exchange, exchange involving relatively few interactants. In contrast, secondary relations often are characterized as faceless, impersonal, ingenuous, and fleeting–the result of large‐group exchange established via mediated or mechanized connections. Cerulo (1997) suggested the need to reformulate any definition of social relations built upon the small group/large group or the direct/mediated dichotomies. She presented several critical elements upon which new definitions could be built. In this piece, we configure those elements, building six new analytic taxonomies–tools we hope will provoke a richer discussion of connecting, interacting, and resulting forms of social relations.

This article considers the current face‐off between “facts vs. alternative facts” as it relates to research on lethal encounters between police and minority citizens. I begin by reviewing major measurement challenges for those studying lethal police shootings and potential improvements for how we document police shootings. I also consider the increasing reliance on use of body cams and surveillance videos for what they may (or may not) bring to improving documentation of police/citizen encounters. Next I address a larger issue that provides the context for the “facts vs. alternative facts” dilemma: science's loss of standing as the recognized superior way of knowing about the world. Growing distrust in science, special interest research, paradigm shifts, and science illiteracy are all considered as reasons for the slippage of science as a credible knowledge source. Additionally, key traits of science (i.e., its inherent skepticism and tentative stance) may actually support the all‐too‐popular view that science no longer has an edge in producing valid and reliable information. I make a case for the need to reform what some see as a broken culture of science and for social researchers to commit to a serious agenda of replication of studies and findings.

Standing up for science is part of sociology's mission as a social science. Standing up is also consistent with our field's ethical obligation to identify and avoid research compromised by conflict of interests.

In recent years, U.S. and other Western media have inundated the public with celebrity apologies. The public (measured via representative opinion polls) then expresses clear ideas about who deserves forgiveness. Is forgiveness highly individualized or tied to broader social, cultural, and cognitive factors? To answer this question, we analyzed 183 celebrity apologies offered between October 1, 2000, and October 1, 2012. Results are twofold and based in both cultural and social psychological perspectives. First, we found that public forgiveness is systematically tied to discursive characteristics of apologies—particularly sequential structures. Certain sequences appear to cognitively prime the public, creating associative links to established cultural scripts of atonement and rendering some apologies more successful than others. Second, public forgiveness is contingent on broader patterns of social interaction. Like many persuasive messages, successful apologies exist as ordered cultural moments steeped in characteristics of the social relations that bind offenders, victims, and a broader audience of onlookers.

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