Using Audre Lorde's The Master's Tools as an epistemic guide, we propose two practice interventions for family science (FS) transformative praxes. The first, inspired by the thought of philosopher Charles Mills, challenges FS practitioners (research, practice, and policy) to explore differences in peripheral and positivist & post-positivist (P&PP) ideologies responsible for differences in beliefs regarding the salience or non-salience of power differentials within FS. The second, inspired by the thought of philosopher Rudolph Carnap, encourages FS practitioners to consider differences in peripheral and P&PP practitioners' understandings of what FS is at its core, and the beliefs and actions guided by their divergent core understandings. Both revelatory practices are intended to transform FS in such a way that its praxes are informed by these ways of practicing, and so that embodied understandings of the importance of pursuing anti-racist and social justice objectives within FS become manifest.

We advance a transformational family science as an engaged practice that may serve social justice and an anti‐racist project. Our companion paper proposed epistemic revelatory interventions through which family science may re‐imagine itself. We highlight pillars of a transformational family science that (a) build with epistemological and paradigmatic stances of peripherals; (b) infuse an ethic of reflexivity, accountability, and responsibility in the pursuit of knowledge claims, and their validation; and (c) engage a critical interrogation of difference and power relations and the disruption of systemic and structural inequalities in which they are aligned. Informed by epistemic praxes, transformational praxes include inquiry, knowledge production, theorizing about structured inequalities, power differentials, and differences bound to social categories and social identities, as well as pedagogy and professional training. Transformative applications that are compensatory, reformative, restorative, reparative, and transformative may be used in multiple ways to advance social justice, anti‐racism, and social transformations.

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Review of Maria del Guadaloupe Davidson, Kathryn T. Gines, and Donna-Dale L. Marcano (eds), Convergences: Black Feminism and Philosophy (Albany: SUNY, 2010).

Given Kripke's semantic views, a statement, such as 'Water is H20', expresses a necessary a posteriori truth. Yet it seems that we can conceive that this statement could have been false; hence, it appears that we can conceive impossible states of affairs as holding. Kripke used a de dicto strategy and a de re strategy to address three illusions that arise with respect to necessary a posteriori truths: (1) the illusion that a statement such as 'Water is H20' possibly expresses a falsehood, (2) the illusion that conceivability can fail to latch on to a genuine metaphysical possibility, and (3) the illusion that one can access a real metaphysical possibility by conceiving that water is not H20. In this paper I argue that while Kripke's de dicto strategy dispeFs (1), his strategies do not enable him to dispel (2) and (3).Though we now acknowledge that the sun does not revolve around the earth, to many it may still seem that we can imagine that it could have so revolved, for it is thought that this is a real metaphysical possibility, one that our imaginations can train. By contrast, states of affairs, such as that Hesperus is not Phosphorus or that heat is not identical to the motion of molecules, are believed by many to be unimaginable, on the ground that we cannot imagine impossibilities, and these states of affairs surely are impossible. Moreover, given that we believe in the truth of a particular identity, and given that we take identity to be a necessary relation, it would seem to violate a principle of rationality to claim that one has imagined a real possibility in which a true identity fails to hold.Under the umbrella of illusions of possibility philosophers have sought to explain what has gone wrong when such apparently false claims are made. Has