Phenomenology is a philosophical discipline aiming to analyze and examine subjective experience. Since the formulation of the basic principles of this tradition, phenomenology has been closely associated with psychiatry. Bearing that the person with psychopathological experiences is the object of psychiatry, phenomenology can provide an adequate framework for understanding such experiences. In this paper, we show how phenomenology can conceptually and methodologically improve diagnosis in psychiatry. In clinical work, phenomenology can be applied in the process of diagnostic reasoning by giving significant nuance and depth to psychopathology within the frame of psychiatric diagnosis. Additionally, phenomenology can add to psychiatric interviews, especially by pointing out the importance of the psychopathological gestalt and eidetic reduction by way of disengaging from different prejudices that might be present in the interviewer.

Autism spectrum disorder is a condition characterized by deficits in social interaction and communication, repetitive patterns of behaviour, and hyper- or hyporeactivity to sensory input. Affordance-based Skilled Intentionality that combines ecological-enactive views of cognition with Free Energy and Predictive Processing was proposed as the framework from which to view autism integrally. Skilled Intentionality distinguishes between a landscape of affordances and a field of affordances. The ecological-enactive approach shows that autistic differences in their field of affordances stem from aberrant precision estimation. Autistics over-rely on the precision afforded by the environment - a stable econiche they build. It is argued that autistics have a narrow field, with shallow temporal depth and great intensity and affective salience of the affordances that do come up in the field. I will build on the ecological-enactive account of autism to suggest that one therapeutic way to shape the autistic field of affordances is through the use of Ambient Smart Environments (ASEs). The understanding of ASEs as a meta-affordance that intervenes on the user's field of affordances was put forward recently. Taking the cue from autistic lived experience while supporting the niche construction style of autistics, ASEs could help minimise environmental uncertainty.

I investigate the status of subjectivity in Integrated Information Theory. This leads me to examine if Integrated Information Theory can answer the hard problem of consciousness. On itself, Integrated Information Theory does not seem to constitute an answer to the hard problem, but could be combined with panpsychism to yield a more satisfying theory of consciousness. I will show, that even if Integrated Information Theory employs the metaphysical machinery of panpsychism, Integrated Information would still suffer from a different problem, not being able to account for the subjective character of consciousness.

Recently, an information-theoretic structural realist theory of the self and consciousness has been put forward (Beni 2019). The theory is presented as a form of panpsychism. I argue against this interpretation and show that Beni's structuralist theory runs into the hard problem of consciousness, in a similar way as the Integrated Information theory of consciousness. Since both of these theories are structuralist and based on the notion of information, I propose to use a solution that has been employed for Integrated Information Theory, namely introducing the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic structure and dynamics (intrinsic information and intrinsic structure). Making these metaphysical enhancements to Beni's structuralist theory of consciousness will give the theory a better chance of overcoming the hard problem. In terms of the metaphysics of consciousness, it takes us beyond physicalism. I then suggest that the information-theoretic structuralist theory of consciousness should, instead of panpsychism and physicalism, be combined with neutral monist ontology which is a better fit. These reworkings could lead to an improved naturalistic account of consciousness -the neutral-structuralist theory of consciousness and the self.

Rad prikazuje kako se enaktivizam može koristiti kao integrativni pojmovni okvir u psihijatriji. Enaktivistički pristup može pomoći u rešavanju problema integracije u psihijatriji, to jest u tome kako da smisleno povežemo različite perspektive iz kojih objašnjavamo uzroke i prirodu psihijatrijskih poremećaja. Enaktivizam nam pruža mogućnost da povežemo fenomenološke, neurofiziološke, sociokulturalne, i egzistencijalne aspekte psihijatrijskih poremećaja i holistički pristupimo razumevanju i lečenju. Objasniću šta je enaktivizam, šta je problem integracije u psihijatriji, te kako, prema Saneke de Han, možemo putem enaktivizma pružiti rešenje ovog problema. Naposletku, predložiću kako se enaktivistički pristup može obogatiti dodavanjem ekološke perspektive.