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According to the International Federation of Social Workers, social work has always been a human rights profession. However, the legalistic language of human rights is often found to be of limited use in the everyday practice of social workers. This article offers a practical and relatable translation of human rights language by operationalising the central human rights value 'human dignity'. In the city of Utrecht, The Netherlands, empirical qualitative research was conducted in order to investigate what dignity might entail for social workers and service-users. The study reveals four different ways in which service-users experience their dignity to be violated: being seen or treated as an object, an empty space, a child or a monster. Conversely, social workers and service-users also try to maintain dignity in four ways: by treating people as a unique person, a participant, an adult or a (professional) friend. Together, these modes of dignity violation and dignity promotion form a typology termed 'the dignity circle'. The dignity circle enables practitioners and policymakers to promote dignity in social work whilst helping them to consider the dilemmas and complexities involved. In this way, the dignity circle provides a practical tool for social work as a human rights profession.

Jacobson (Social Science & Medicine 64:292–302, 2007) finds two distinct meanings of “dignity” in the literature on dignity and health: (1) intrinsic human dignity and (2) social dignity constituted through interactions with caregivers. Especially the latter has been central in empirical health research and warrants further exploration. This article focuses on the social dignity of people marginalized by mental illness, substance abuse and comparable conditions in extramural settings. 35 studies published between 2007 and 2017 have addressed this issue, most of them identifying norms for social dignity: civilized interactions, non-stigmatizing treatment, treatment as unique individuals, being taken seriously, maintaining a positive identity, experiencing independence, relating to others, and participating in daily life. We argue that these norms belong to ideal theory, whereas we agree with Robeyns (Social Theory and Practice 34:341–362, 2008) and others that improving practice is better served by non-ideal theory. Towards this end, we derive from the literature four building blocks for a non-ideal theory of dignity: (1) avoid violations of dignity rather than seeking to promote it; (2) dignity is not a goal to be reached; it requires ongoing effort; (3) promoting dignity is a balancing act; contradictory norms can make it impossible to realize; and (4) dignity can be undermined by organizational and discursive constraints.

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