The theoretical separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello provides important protection during armed conflict. It guarantees that jus in bello will apply regardless of the cause of a conflict. However, this distinction has been challenged by the view that in some cases a situation of self-defence may be so extreme, and the threat to the survival of the state so great, that violations of jus in bello may be warranted. The situation is compounded by the confusion of the principles of necessity and proportionality under jus ad bellum and jus in bello in both academic writing and the jurisprudence of international courts. The dangers of blurring the distinction will be elucidated by examining how jus ad bellum considerations have affected the application of jus in bello in armed conflicts between states and non-state actors.International law represents, in essence, a struggle against the subjectivity of politics. 1 Nowhere is this more evident than in the law of armed conflict, which seeks to regulate the conduct of states in an apparently extra-legal situation. After more Volume

On 19 February 2013, a Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)-administered Court of Arbitration issued a Partial Award on the dispute between Pakistan and India regarding the use of the waters of the Kishenganga/Neelum, a tributary of the Indus system of rivers. This article examines the tribunal's decision, which was mainly limited to interpreting the 1960 Indus Water Treaty (IWT), and its contribution to international environmental law and the law of non-navigational uses of international watercourses. After briefly discussing the dispute's factual context and procedural history, the article critiques the tribunal's methodology, which was based on an inconsistent application of the principles of treaty interpretation. The Award's contribution is therefore mixed: despite its almost complete disregard for the principle of ‘equality of right’, it has contributed to clarifying the criteria for determining ‘existing uses’ of a watercourse and reaffirmed both the substantive obligation to refrain from causing transboundary harm and the procedural duty to carry out an Environmental Impact Assessment under international environmental law.

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