Grasping an object requires processing visuospatial information about the extrinsic features (spatial location) and intrinsic features (size, shape, orientation) of the object. Accordingly, manual prehension has been subdivided into a reach component, guiding the hand toward the object on the basis of its extrinsic features, and a grasp component, preshaping the fingers around the center of mass of the object on the basis of its intrinsic features. In neural terms, this distinction has been linked to a dedicated dorsomedial "reaching" circuit and a dorsolateral "grasping" circuit that process extrinsic and intrinsic features, linking occipital areas via parietal regions with the dorsal and ventral premotor cortex, respectively. We have tested an alternative possibility, namely that the relative contribution of the two circuits is related to the degree of on-line control required by the prehension movement.We used dynamic causal modeling of functional magnetic resonance imaging time series to assess how parieto-frontal connectivity is modulated by planning and executing prehension movements toward objects of different size and width. This experimental manipulation evoked different movements, with different planning and execution phases for the different objects. Crucially, grasping large objects increased inter-regional couplings within the dorsomedial circuit, whereas grasping small objects increased the effective connectivity of a mainly dorsolateral circuit, with a degree of overlap between these circuits. These results argue against the presence of dedicated cerebral circuits for reaching and grasping, suggesting that the contributions of the dorsolateral and the dorsomedial circuits are a function of the degree of on-line control required by the movement.

In the last decade, the phenomenon of empathy has received widespread attention by the field of social neuroscience. This has provided fresh insights for theoretical models of empathy, and substantially influenced the academic and public conceptions about this complex social skill. The present paper highlights three key issues which are often linked to empathy, but which at the same time might obscure our understanding of it. These issues are: (1) shared neural activations and whether these can be interpreted as evidence for simulation accounts of empathy; (2) the causal link of empathy to our presumed mirror neuron system; and (3) the question whether increasing empathy will result in better moral decisions and behaviors. The aim of our review is to provide the basis for critically evaluating our current understanding of empathy, and its public reception, and to inspire new research directions.

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Recent behavioral investigations suggest that acute stress can increase prosocial behavior. Here, we investigated whether increased empathy represents a potential mechanism for this finding. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we assessed the effects of acute stress on neural responses related to automatic and regulatory components of empathy for pain as well as subsequent prosocial behavior. Stress increased activation in brain areas associated with the automatic sharing of others’ pain, such as the anterior insula, the anterior midcingulate cortex, and the primary somatosensory cortex. In addition, we found increased prosocial behavior under stress. Furthermore, activation in the anterior midcingulate cortex mediated the effects of stress on prosocial behavior. However, stressed participants also displayed stronger and inappropriate other-related responses in situations which required them to take the perspective of another person, and to regulate their automatic affective responses. Thus, while acute stress may increase prosocial behavior by intensifying the sharing of others’ emotions, this comes at the cost of reduced cognitive appraisal abilities. Depending on the contextual constraints, stress may therefore affect empathy in ways that are either beneficial or detrimental.