We examine how management control practices relate to the implementation of a corporate lean program at the factory level. Our empirical analysis uses data from a large manufacturing firm that is implementing a corporate lean program in its global plant network. We find that using dedicated teams to lead the lean program, developing and frequently reviewing lean-focused performance reports, and using nonfinancial rewards linked to lean implementation are favorably associated with more extensive implementation of lean practices in the factories. We do not find evidence that the use of managementinitiated internal audits and financial rewards tied to lean implementation are strongly associated with more extensive lean implementation. We also present evidence of a positive relation between lean implementation and improvements in operational performance in the factories. Overall, these findings suggest that when implementing a corporate lean program, the firm must pay careful attention to the type of management control practices it uses for controlling the input, process, and output aspects of the lean program.

Prior CEO turnover literature characterizes the board's decision as a choice between retaining versus replacing the CEO. We focus instead on the CEO's decision rights and introduce a third option in which the incumbent CEO is removed but retained on the board for an extended period, which we call Retention Light. Firms may benefit from Retention Light because former CEOs possess unique monitoring and advising abilities, but the former CEO could also exploit available decision rights for personal benefit. A Retention Light CEO's decision rights generally exceed those of CEOs who exit the firm entirely but fall short of the rights of a retained CEO. We find that when prior firm performance is better, the former CEO is more likely to be retained on the board (Retention Light) than to exit the firm. However, this relation is weaker when the CEO reaches normal retirement age at which time CEO power becomes more important. We also provide evidence on how the nature of the CEO's bargaining power varies with his personal attributes and board characteristics in its influence on the Retention Light decision. Retention Light firms are more likely than CEO‐exit firms to select a successor CEO with relatively weaker bargaining power. Finally, Retention Light involving a nonfounder CEO is negatively associated with the firm's postturnover financial performance. Overall, Retention Light is a distinct CEO turnover option that has important consequences for board decisions and firm performance.

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This study examines whether the potential for hold-up in supply chains influences the extent of process integration and information sharing between partners. The analysis uses performance scorecards and financial performance data collected from a major manufacturer regarding its contractual arrangements with 156 distributors. I find that distributors engage in less extensive process integration and information sharing with the manufacturer as the potential for hold-up increases, measured by the asymmetry of interdependence between partners. I also find that distributors engage in more extensive process integration and information sharing as the potential for hold-up decreases, measured by the magnitude of interdependence between partners. Additional evidence shows that more extensive process integration and information sharing have favorable financial performance implications for supply chain partners and enhance the likelihood of distributor contract renewal. Overall, the results indicate that the potential for hold-up can restrict the performance benefits available to partners from developing more extensive supply chain integration practices. Data Availability: A confidentiality agreement restricts data availability. Some data have been modified by a common factor to preserve research site confidentiality.