Abstract. Power Analysis has been studied since 1998 when P. Kocher et al. presented the first attack. From the initial Simple Power Analysis more complex techniques have been designed and studied during the previous decade such as Differential and Correlation Power Analysis. In this paper we revisit Simple Power Analysis which is at the heart of side channel techniques. We aim at showing its true efficiency when studied rigorously. Based on existing Chosen Message attacks we explain in this paper how particular message values can reveal the secret exponent manipulated during a modular exponentiation with a single power consumption curve. We detail the different ways to achieve this and then show that some blinded exponentiations can still be threatened by Simple Power Analysis depending on the implementation. Finally we will give advice on countermeasures to prevent such enhanced Simple Power Analysis techniques.

Modern home networks are becoming more and more complex with the integration of various types of interconnected smart devices, using heterogeneous networking technologies. Many of these devices are also connected to the Internet, generally through an integrated access device. Those smart devices are potentially vulnerable to several types of attacks. In this practical experience report we investigate the specific case of smart TVs. The main objective is to experimentally explore possible attack vectors and identify practically exploitable vulnerabilities and attack scenarios. In particular, the study covers local and remote attacks using different entry points, including the Digital Video Broadcasting (DVB) transmission channel and the copper-pair local loop. Several methods, allowing to observe and simulate service provider networks, are used to support several experiments considering four types of commercially available smart TVs for a comparative analysis. We also discuss several methods allowing to extract and analyze the embedded firmware, and obtain relevant information concerning target devices.

Abstract. The purpose of failure analysis is to locate the source of a defect in order to characterize it, using different techniques (laser stimulation, light emission, electromagnetic emission...). Moreover, the aim of vulnerability analysis, and particularly side-channel analysis, is to observe and collect various leakages information of an integrated circuit (power consumption, electromagnetic emission ...) in order to extract sensitive data. Although these two activities appear to be distincted, they have in common the observation and extraction of information about a circuit behavior. The purpose of this paper is to explain how and why these activities should be combined. Firstly it is shown that the leakage due to the light emitted during normal operation of a CMOS circuit can be used to set up an attack based on the DPA/DEMA technique. Then a second method based on laser stimulation is presented, improving the "traditional" attacks by injecting a photocurrent, which results in a punctual increase of the power consumption of a circuit. These techniques are demonstrated on an FPGA device.

Failure analysis tools and methods can be used for security purposes as well as the security attack techniques can be used in failure analysis. In this paper, we describe the last results obtained concerning light emission techniques and their use to set up a side channel methodology. From a cryptanalyst standpoint, the light emission could be a potential source of leakage. When studying a specific cipher algorithm implemented in a device, by analysing this new kind of leakage it is possible to retrieve secret sensitive data. We made our analyses on an FPGA device, which makes the attack harder to perform than on a standard ASIC. Furthermore, the technique was validated on a device in 0.13μm technology, resulting in a more complex sample preparation from backside. We will show that, the leakage due to the light emitted during normal operation of a CMOS circuit, can be used to set up an attack based on the well-known DPA technique.

Home Internet connections are becoming more and more important in our every day life. Many Internet Service Providers (ISP) include an Integrated Access Device (IAD) in their offers allowing the customer to easily take advantage of all the included services. This IAD is connected to a local loop, most of the time based on the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN). The local loop and the IAD together constitute the access network of an ISP. To our knowledge, very few studies addressed the security of these access networks. This is the purpose of this paper. We first present a platform and a set of experiments aiming at capturing and analysing communications on the local loop. This platform allowed us to carry out a comparative study of the security of six IADs from different ISPs, by analysing the network protocols used during their boot-up process. The results of this first study revealed a security weakness for two of the six access networks, especially during the firmware update procedure of the IADs. A second platform and set of experiments are then presented, which allow us to experimentaly test the possible exploitation scenarios of the identified weakness. Finally, we show that the security issues pointed out above, dont only impact the IAD, but also any other home Internet connected device, implementing firmware updates.