This article empirically tests five structural models of corporate bond pricing: those of Merton (1974), Geske (1977), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Leland and Toft (1996), and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). We implement the models using a sample of 182 bond prices from firms with simple capital structures during the period 1986-1997. The conventional wisdom is that structural models do not generate spreads as high as those seen in the bond market, and true to expectations, we find that the predicted spreads in our implementation of the Merton model are too low. However, most of the other structural models predict spreads that are too high on average. Nevertheless, accuracy is a problem, as the newer models tend to severely overstate the credit risk of firms with high leverage or volatility and yet suffer from a spread underprediction problem with safer bonds. The Leland and Toft model is an exception in that it overpredicts spreads on most bonds, particularly those with high coupons. More accurate structural models must avoid features that increase the credit risk on the riskier bonds while scarcely affecting the spreads of the safest bonds. The seminal work of Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) in the area of corporate bond pricing has spawned an enormous theoretical literature on risky debt pricing. One motivating factor for this burgeoning literature is the perception that the Merton model cannot generate sufficiently high-yield spreads to match those observed in the market. Thus the recent theoretical literature includes a variety of extensions and We are grateful to an anonymous referee and especially Ken Singleton and Maureen O'Hara (the editors) for detailed and helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank

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The literature on IPOs offers a wide variety of explanations to justify the dramatic swings in the volume of IPOs observed in the market. Many theories predict that hot IPO markets are characterized by clusters of firms in particular industries for which a technological innovation has occurred, suggesting that hot and cold market IPO firms will differ in quality, prospects, or types of business. Others suggest hot market IPOs are firms that take advantage of irrational investors. We compare firms that go public in a number of hot and cold markets during 1975-2000, examining them at the time of the IPO and during the following five years. We find that both hot and cold market IPOs are largely concentrated in the same narrow set of industries and hot markets for many industries occur at the same time. We also find few distinctions in quality and scant evidence that hot market IPOs have better growth prospects. Our results suggest that technological innovations are not the primary determinant of hot markets because IPO markets cycle with greater frequency than the underlying innovations, and are more in line with the view that hot markets reflect greater investor optimism, though not necessarily active manipulation by managers.

Many theoretical bond pricing models predict that the credit yield curve facing risky bond issuers is downward-sloping. Previous empirical research~Sarig and Warga~1989!, Fons~1994!! supports these models. Our study examines sets of bonds issued by the same firm with equal priority in the liability structure, but with different maturities, thus holding credit quality constant. We find, counter to prior research, that risky bonds typically have upward-sloping credit yield curves. Moreover, when we combine our matched sets of bonds~no longer controlling credit quality!, the estimated slope is negative, indicating a sample selection bias problem associated with maturity.

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