Bolivia recently implemented new reforms granting autonomy to departmental, regional, municipal, and indigenous and rural governments. What effects might these have on public investment patterns, government responsiveness, government fiscal relations, the sustainability of public finances, and political accountability? I examine autonomies in light of fiscal federalism theory, and evidence on the effects of Bolivia's 1994 decentralization. By submitting new reforms to the dual rigors of theory and evidence, we can try to arrive at contingent predictions of its likely effects. These allow us to make recommendations for adjustments that may strengthen democracy and give voice to the poor.

This symposium engages two recent books on regional governance. The first sets out a measure of regional authority for 81 countries in North America, Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Pacific from 1950 to 2010. The second theorizes how regional governance is shaped by functional and communal pressures. These pressures are detected in many historical episodes of jurisdictional reform. These books seek to pin them down empirically. Community and efficiency appear to have tangible and contrasting effects that explain how jurisdictions are designed, why regional governance has become differentiated, and how multilevel governance has deepened over the past several decades.