The delusional misidentification syndromes (DMS) are a group of disorders, characterized by patients mistaking the identity of people they know, although they recognize them physically. The term DMS is an umbrella term which may cover disorders whose definition extends to objects other than people, such as animals, places, or familiar material objects. The most common and best known DMS is Capgras syndrome. In this disorder, the misidentification leads to the delusional conviction that a close friend or relative has been replaced by an identical - or almost identical - "double," whose original has disappeared. This double is an imposter without name or identity. Most often considered as a persecutor, the double may be subjected to aggression, which may be very violent. Neuropsychological hypotheses based on cerebral dysfunctions are now commonly considered to be at the origin of the disorder. They have been elaborated from achievements in the neurosciences, particularly the facial recognition models. In return, knowledge about the normal cognitive processes involved in recognition and familiarity has benefited from the work that cognitive neuropsychiatry has invested in these disorders. The DMS are observed in various contexts of morbidity: primary psychiatric diagnosis, or secondary to various organic disorders, particularly in neurodegenerative disease; they are rarely met in isolated form. Most often, they develop in line with the associated pathology. In the absence of consensual clinical description, the epidemiology of DMS is uncertain; they may be more frequent than previously supposed. There is no specific treatment for these disorders; neuroleptics are generally used in association with treatment of the concomitant disorder. The frequent association of DMS with organic disorders which may be curable and the particularly dangerous profile of these patients are factors that underline the need for better screening.

The editors first describe the principal symptoms of the Capgras delusion, the FrÉgoli delusion, the delusion of intermeta-morphosis and the delusion of subjective doubles before developing the argument that it would be appropriate for international psychiatric diagnostic systems to include these disorders. Furthermore the similarity between them, the reduplicative paramnesias and dÉjÀ and jamais vu are pointed out. By stressing a symptom-based approach it is possible to examine psychiatric, neurological and medical cases as arising from the same underlying disturbance in cognition function. The relationship between delusions of misidentification and other delusions is also touched upon.

No abstract

No abstract

No abstract