With a new planning system taking shape, and a new Bill of Rights embodied in a transformative Constitution having been introduced in South Africa in 1994, this article grapples with the dual questions as to whether the new spatial planning system fits within the spirit of the Bill of Rights, and the Bill of Rights assists the new spatial planning system in the realisation of its objectives. As a prequel to the engagement with these questions, a brief overview of the events leading to institution of the Bill of Rights and its contents is provided. This is followed by a brief historical overview of the creation of the South African spatial planning system and a summary of its key features. These features can be reduced to the following basic components: (1) meaningful participation in all aspects of spatial planning; (2) an open, inclusive and just decision-making process where information is readily available; (3) recognition of religion and culture and equal treatment in application and decision-making; (4) an awareness of environmental issues; and (5) the significance of property and housing. The way in which these components are addressed in the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provides the starting point to determine the extent to which there is a meaningful and mutually beneficial fit between the planning system and the Bill of Rights.

Our spatial environment is one of the most important determinants of our well-being and life chances. It relates to schools, opportunities, businesses, recreation and access to public services. Spatial injustice results where discrimination determines that spatial environment. Since Apartheid in South Africa epitomised the notion of spatial injustice, tools and instruments are required to transform spatial injustice into spatial justice. One of these is the employment of principles of spatial justice. While the National Development Plan (NDP) recognised that all spatial development should conform to certain normative principles and should explicitly indicate how the requirements of these should be met, the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA) contains a more concrete principle of spatial justice. It echoes aspects of both the South African land reform programme and global principles of spatial justice. Essentially section 7(a) of SPLUMA entails three components: (1) redressing past spatial imbalances and exclusions; (2) including people and areas previously excluded and (3) upgrading informal areas and settlements. SPLUMA directs municipalities to apply the principle in its spatial development frameworks, land use schemes and, most importantly, in decision-making on development applications. The aim of this article is to determine whether the application of this principle in practice can move beyond the confines of spatial planning and land use management to address the housing issue in South Africa. Central to housing is section 26 of the Constitution, that has received the extensive attention of the Constitutional Court. The court has not hesitated to criticize the continuing existence of spatial injustice, thus contributing to the transformation of spatial injustice to spatial justice. Since planning, housing and land reform are all intertwined not only the role of SPLUMA, but also the NDP and the myriad other policies, programmes and legislation that are attempting to address the situation are examined and tested against the components of the principle of spatial justice in SPLUMA.

In addition there is the rei vindicatio. Although eviction legislation has significantly affected the applicability of the rei vindicatio it does still apply, albeit in very limited circumstances. These would be where there is eviction from land or property only when it is being used for business, trade or industrial purposes. 18 The only incident of residential eviction not to be regulated by PIE, it seems, is a holiday home, which the SCA has held does not fall within the definition of "building or structure" as it does not function as a "habitual dwelling" or "home". 19 14

This note offers a critical reflection of the recent landmark decision in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal which lay to rest the negative consequences of employing the DFA procedures of the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 (DFA) alongside those of the provincial Ordinances to establish townships (or to use DFA parlance, “land development areas”). The welcome and timely decision in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal has declared invalid chapters V and VI of the DFA. Moreover, it has formalised planning terminology in South Africa, delineated the boundaries of “municipal planning” and “urban planning and development” as listed in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 and, in the process, clarified the structure of planning law. This note examines the decision of the SCA and focus on the role it will clearly have in reforming some of the law relating to planning. It considers the facts of the case, uncertainties around terminology, the structure of planning in South Africa, the content of municipal planning, the role of the DFA and the consequences of the declaration of invalidity by the SCA.

The Constitution determines that the legislative and executive powers regarding 'regional planning and development', 'urban and rural development', 'provincial planning' and 'municipal planning' are divided among the three spheres of government. Yet the boundaries between these items listed in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution are opaque and their precise content is not always apparent. Overlaps, conflicts and uncertainty may occur. In a number of landmark decisions the courts have provided content to these different functional areas. Clarity on what 'municipal planning' comprises leads to more certainty on the content of the other planning areas. Draft legislation such as the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Bill (B14-2012) can also assist in adding substance to a demarcation of these different functional areas.  Yet uncertainties still remain, occasioned by constitutional provisions such as sections 100, 139(1) and 155(6)-(7), that permit intervention by national and provincial government in provinces and municipalities respectively, as well as the support and monitoring by provincial government in respect of municipalities. Few clear solutions are immediately apparent. The role of the constitutional principles of co-operative government where uncertainty and conflict exist is examined, especially where no veto of one sphere over another is possible. Principles of interpretation can also assist in delineating the boundaries of the different functional areas. It seems, however, that the courts will find themselves having to address the remaining inconsistencies.