Is the self-esteem of individuals tied to their nation? If so, is that a good reason to strive for a world of safe, secure nations? Many liberal nationalists answer yes to these questions, but they do so without looking at the large social-psychology literature on groups and self-esteem. We examine the claims of liberal nationalists in light of this literature. The good news is that self-respectWe use the terms self-respect and self-esteem interchangeably. and group identity are strongly connected and can lead people to place collective interests above individual interests. The bad news is that the liberal-nationalist assumption that low-status groups have little self-respect and majority groups have it in abundance is mistaken. Perhaps most worrisome is the competitive nature of collective self-esteem: people feel better when their group does better than others. This competitiveness can lead to outright hostility when groups compete for resources and political power. Self-esteem is clearly an unstable foundation for a liberal nation. Although we do not think that problems caused by national identity and self-esteem can be fully solved, we do suggest ways in which they can be contained.

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Some feminists have recently charged multicultural theorists of ignoring the rights of women in their arguments to secure group rights. Too often, these feminists charge, group rights are used to subordinate women. Group rights may appear fair in the abstract but in fact they often mean giving rights to the particular leaders of these groups; when these leaders are men with a traditional view of the world, as they often are, then it is hardly surprising, though certainly disturbing, that group rights are often used to oppress women.The most persuasive part of the feminist argument is against what Ayelet Shachar calls 'strong multiculturalism,' but what I will call group autonomy; this form of multiculturalism gives groups power over its members through "strong formal and legal recognition."' This multiculturalism concentrates on justice between groups, ignoring justice within groups. Nothing is done when the group uses its rights to oppress women, even though, according to Martha Nussbaum, in the case of religion, "we should not accept the idea that denying any fundamental right of any individual is a legitimate prerogative of a religious group. "2 Since some groups discriminate against women, group autonomy often undermines women's rights and equality.Though the liberal state usually ought to support autonomy and equality, there are times when it should refrain from doing so. The * Thanks to

The Protestant conception of religion as a private matter of conscience organized into voluntary associations informed early liberalism’s conception of religion and of religious toleration, assumptions that are still present in contemporary liberalism. In many other religions, however, including Hinduism (the main though not only focus of this article), practice has a much larger role than conscience. Hinduism is not a voluntary association, and the structure of its practices, some of which are inegalitarian, makes exit very difficult. This makes liberal religious toleration an awkward fit for Hinduism; granting religious toleration in India undermines equality and autonomy in severe ways. Yet Hinduism is not without its virtues, and has historically been what I call externally tolerant—it has been relatively tolerant of other religions. Liberal toleration, by contrast, is internally tolerant—it is tolerant of religions that fit the Protestant model, while its tolerance of others is considerably more qualified. I briefly speculate at the end of the article about how to combine these two models of toleration.

Advocates of remedying historical injustices urge political communities to take responsibility for their past, but their arguments are ambiguous about whether all past injustices need remedy, or just those regarding groups that suffer from current injustice. This ambiguity leaves unanswered the challenge of critics who argue that contemporary injustices matter, not those in the past. I argue instead for a focus on injustices that have roots in the past, and continue to the present day, what I call enduring injustice. Instead of focusing on finding the party responsible for the injustice, I argue that we use history to help us understand why some injustices endure, which I suggest is partly due to the limitations of liberal justice. I conclude with a conception of responsibility for repairing enduring injustice that deemphasizes searching for the causal agent, and instead focuses on how to repair the injustice, which I explain through an expansive conception of shared space.