According to the doctrine of divine simplicity, God is an absolutely simple being lacking any distinct metaphysical parts, properties, or constituents. Although this doctrine was once an essential part of traditional philosophical theology, it is now widely rejected as incoherent. In this paper, I develop an interpretation of the doctrine designed to resolve contemporary concerns about its coherence, as well as to show precisely what is required to make sense of divine simplicity.

It is standardly assumed that there are three-and only three-ways to solve problem of temporary intrinsics: (a) embrace presentism, (b) relativize property possession to times, or (c) accept the doctrine of temporal parts. The first two solutions are favored by endurantists, whereas the third is the perdurantist solution of choice. In this paper, I argue that there is a further type of solution available to endurantists, one that not only avoids the usual costs, but is structurally identical to the temporal-parts solution preferred by perdurantists. In addition to providing a general characterization of this new type of solution, I discuss certain of its anticipations in the literature on bundle theory, as well as provide a detailed development of it in terms of my own preferred metaphysics of ordinary objects-namely, a distinctive form of substratum theory tracing to Aristotle. Ordinary objects persist. And on our ordinary conception of persistence, they do so by enduring-that is, by being wholly present at each of the times they exist. Thus, to say that Socrates persists is just to say that the whole of him is present at each of the times of his existence. Many philosophers now reject our ordinary conception of persistence in favor of the doctrine of temporal parts. On the standard development of this doctrine, things persist not by enduring but by perduring-that is, by being partially present at each of the times they exist. Thus, to say that Socrates persists is just to say that a part of him (namely, one of his temporal parts) is present at each of the times of his existence. 1 One of the best-known contemporary arguments for the doctrine of temporal parts is David Lewis's argument from temporary intrinsics. This argument identifies an alleged problem for intrinsic change and then suggests that only the temporal-parts theorist has the resources for an adequate solution. To illustrate, suppose that Socrates is seated in the morning (and so bent), but later in afternoon decides to stand up (and so ceases to be bent and becomes straight instead). Such changes in shape are utterly familiar; but they might also seem impossible. For, from the claim that Socrates is seated in the morning, it seems to follow that he is seated; and from the claim that he is standing in the afternoon, it seems to follow that he is standing. (This on the general principle that if Socrates has a property at some time, he has it simpliciter.) But, of course, nothing can be both seated and standing. How, then, can one and the same object, Socrates, have such different shapes at different times? According to Lewis, there are only three solutions: (α) Embrace presentism; (β) Relativize property possession to times; (γ) Accept the doctrine of temporal parts. 1 The doctrine of temporal parts is sometimes developed in such a way that things persist not by having temporal parts at each of the times they exist ('worm theory'), but rather by having counterparts at each of these times ('stage theory'). Cf. Sider 2001 and 2000. In what follows, I f...

This chapter starts with a precise statement of the problem of the Trinity. It then examines the Aristotelian notion of numerical sameness without identity, explains how it solves the problem of material constitution, and defends it against the most obvious and important objections to it. It also distinguishes numerical sameness without identity from two superficially similar relations. The chapter shows how the Aristotelian solution to the problem of material constitution can be developed into a solution to the problem of the Trinity, and highlights some of the more interesting consequences of the solution. Applying the analogy to the case of God, the chapter suggests that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are to be understood as doing something analogous to sharing the same matter.

No abstract

This essay explores some of the central aspects of Aquinas's account of mental representation, focusing in particular on his views about the intentionality of concepts (or intelligible species). It begins by demonstrating the need for a new interpretation of his account, showing in particular that the standard interpretations all face insurmountable textual difficulties. It then develops the needed alternative and explains how it avoids the sorts of problems plaguing the standard interpretations. Finally, it draws out the implications of this interpretation with the aim of correcting some persistent misunderstandings of the connection between Aquinas's views and those developed by contemporary philosophers of mind.