Background: Interest in the relationship between forgiveness and health is steadily growing across disciplines within the research community. While there are multiple forms of forgiveness, past research has focused principally on studying forgiveness of others, whereas longitudinal evidence on the associations between other forms of forgiveness and health remains scarce. Methods: Using longitudinal data from the Nurses' Health Study II (from the 2008 Trauma Exposure and Post-traumatic Stress Supplementary Survey to 2015 questionnaire wave), this study employed an outcome-wide analytic approach to prospectively examine the association between two forms of religiously or spiritually motivated forgiveness, namely, self-forgiveness and divine forgiveness, and a wide array of subsequent psychosocial well-being, mental health, health behavior, and physical health outcomes among middle-aged female nurses (N = 54,703 for self-forgiveness; N = 51,661 for divine forgiveness). All models controlled for sociodemographic factors, prior religious service attendance, and prior values of all outcome variables wherever data were available. Bonferroni correction was used to account for multiple testing. Results: Self-forgiveness was strongly associated with greater psychosocial well-being (e.g., for top vs. bottom level of self-forgiveness, β = 0.23, 95% CI: 0.20, 0.25 for positive affect) and lower psychological distress (e.g., β = −0.21, 95% CI: −0.23, −0.18 for depressive symptoms). To a lesser extent, divine forgiveness was also associated with higher levels of psychological well-being and lower psychological distress. For both forgiveness types, there was little evidence of association with physical health or health behavior outcomes, though possible marginal evidence for an association of self-forgiveness with increased mortality.

Psychological researchers have advanced several instruments to measure meaning. Philosophers have debated the objective versus subjective status of meaning in life and on the global versus individual or personal aspects of meaning. In this chapter, the authors make use of an emerging consensus in the psychology literature concerning a tripartite structure of meaning as cognitive coherence, affective significance, and motivational direction. They enrich this understanding with important philosophical distinctions to distinguish subdomains within this tripartite understanding. The authors use relevant philosophical distinctions to classify existing measurement items into a seven-fold structure intended to more comprehensively assess an individual’s sense of meaning. The proposed measure, with three items in each subdomain drawn from previous scales, constitutes what is put forward as the Comprehensive Measure of Meaning to hopefully enrich the empirical research on the assessment of, and on the causes and effects of, having a sense of meaning.

The question of meaning in life has enjoyed renewed attention in analytic discourse over the last few decades. Despite the apparently “existential” quality of this topic, existential philosophy has had little impact on this re-energized conversation. This paper draws on Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Death in order to challenge the objectivist theory of meaning in life. According to that theory, a meaningful life is one replete with objective goods. Kierkegaard, however, exposits four forms of the spiritual sickness he calls despair that are compatible with the possession of objective goods. If this account is convincing, it poses a challenge to the objectivist view, suggesting that a subjective contribution is also necessary to fully account for meaning in life. By a process of negative inference, this paper concludes by sketching out what this subjective contribution might look like and suggests the term “authenticity” in order to capture this subjective element of a meaningful life.

Engaging the thought of the Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard, I challenge a tendency within the analytic tradition of philosophy on the subject of meaning in life. Taking as a starting point Kierkegaard's insights about meaning in life, the striving needed to attain an imagined ideal self, and his paradoxical conception of the perfection available to human life, I claim that meaning in life is a function of an individual's striving for an ideal self. This continuous effort to achieve myself is marked by suffering, an indispensable part of Kierkegaard's project of identity formation. The imagined grasp of a possible ideal self is essential to this process but insufficient for it because the imagination can only ever glimpse a kind of static perfection, not the lived perfection that only results from willed actualization of an ideal self. The meaning of a human life, then, consists in the suffering that results from a struggle to actualize the ideal I aspire to become in the process of identity formation. I contrast this view with a tendency shared by many contemporary analytic philosophers of meaning in life, for whom meaning in life is constituted by achievement of valued goods, without much attention to one's relation to the process of achieving them. In that respect, I will focus on the position of Iddo Landau. After clearing a number of his misconceptions about Kierkegaard's philosophy, I claim that, for a life to be meaningful, valued goods in life must be complemented by a conscious enactment of the process of the formation of one's identity that includes striving to attain a kind of perfection. I conclude that Kierkegaard's paradoxical account of perfectionism makes him more of an ally to Landau than an opponent.