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The monetary and payment system consequences of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks are reviewed and compared to selected U.S. banking crises. Interbank payment disruptions appear to be the central feature of all the crises reviewed. For some the initial trigger is a credit shock, while for others the initial shock is technological and operational, as in September 11, but for both types the payments system effects are similar. For various reasons, interbank payment disruptions appear likely to recur. Federal Reserve credit extension following September 11 succeeded in massively increasing the supply of banks' balances to satisfy the disruption-induced increase in demand and thereby ameliorate the effects of the shock. Relatively benign banking conditions helped make Fed credit policy manageable. An interbank payment disruption that coincided with less favorable banking conditions could be more difficult to manage, given current daylight credit policies.

In a simple risk-sharing environment with ex post private information, conditions are found under which a collateralized debt contract is the optimal allocation. The critical condition for optimality is that the borrower values the collateral good more highly than does the lender; otherwise the optimal contract does not resemble debt. Limited collateral can give rise to an endogenous borrowing constraint, driving a further wedge between the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution of the borrower and the lender. I argue that perhaps all debt contracts are implicitly collateralized. JEL Nos. D82, G10.

Central bank or International Monetary Fund lending should be regarded as a line of credit, analogous to private line-of-credit products. Contractual provisions in private line-of-credit arrangements are designed to control managerial moral hazard and provide a means for profit-maximizing lenders to credibly commit to withdraw credit and induce closure when appropriate. The contractual mechanisms utilized by private line-ofcredit providers are not effective for a central bank whose primary mission-to maintain financial system stability-can override its obligation to protect public funds and undercut its ability to limit its lending reach. We consider in some detail five broad approaches to a central bank's commitment problem: good offices only, collateralization and early intervention, constructive ambiguity, extending supervisory and regulatory reach, and reputation building. Our analysis suggests that the first four institutional approaches cannot be counted on to overcome the fundamental forces inducing a central bank to lend. We argue that the only practical way for a central bank to credibly limit lending is for it to build up over time a reputation for restraint.