A large number of studies have examined the finding that recognition memory for faces of one's own age group is often superior to memory for faces of another age group. We examined this own-age bias (OAB) in the meta-analyses reported. These data showed that hits were reliably greater for same-age relative to other-age faces (g = 0.23) and that false alarms were reliably less likely for same-age compared with other-age faces (g = -0.23). Further meta-analyses of measures of signal detection demonstrated that, although no difference in response criterion was evident (g = -0.01), discriminability was reliably better for same-age compared with other-age faces (g = 0.37). As well, children, younger adults, and older adults exhibited superior discriminability for same-age compared with other-age age faces. Thus, the OAB appears to be a robust effect that influences the accuracy of face recognition. Theoretical accounts of the OAB have generally suggested that it reflects more extensive, recent experiences with one's own age group relative to other-age groups. Additional analyses were supportive of this account as the OAB was present even for groups (e.g., older adults) that had prior experiences as members of another age group. However, the most comprehensive account of the OAB will also likely invoke mechanisms suggested by social-cognitive theories.

No abstract

The present study attempted to determine the effect of a levels-of-processing manipulation on the incidence of false recall. In Experiment 1,participants engaged in either a vowel counting task or a concrete/abstract rating task; in Experiment 2, participants engaged in either a vowel counting task or a category sorting task. Results of both experiments demonstrated that participants who engaged in a deeper level of processing (i.e., concrete/abstract ratings or category sorting) recalled significantly more list items and critical lures. The present findings thus lend support to theories that attribute false memories to activation-based factors.The subject of false memories-memories for events that never occurred-has received a great deal of attention in the past few years. Roediger and McDermott (1995) discussed a long-ignored study conducted by Deese (1959) that provides a method that consistently produces false memories. Deese presented participants with a list ofwords that were associates of a single, nonpresented item. For example, participants were presented with a list of words that are the twelve most common associates to the word sleep, such as bed, rest, awake, tired, dream, wake, snooze, blanket, doze, slumber, snore, and nap, but the participants were never presented with the critical lure sleep. Results demonstrated that participants consistently recalled the critical lure from each list at a level comparable to the list items. Deese's study therefore provides a method by which false memories can be reliably produced. Numerous studies have since replicated Deese's findings and have found the paradigm to produce a robust false-memory effect (Anastasi, Rhodes, & Burns, 2000;Gallo, Roberts, & Seamon, 1997;Norman & Schacter, 1997; Payne, Elie, Blackwell, & Neuschatz, 1996;Payne, Neuschatz, Lampinen, & Lynn, 1997;Roediger & McDermott, 1995;Seamon, Luo, & Gallo, 1998). However, much ofthe current literature has focused on the boundary conditions sufficient for producing false memories but has ignored the underlying processes and theoretical factors involved in the creation of false memories.Underwood's (1965) implicit associative response (IAR) theory is the most often cited explanation for the falsememory phenomenon. Underwood proposed that when a word is presented during encoding, a participant may implicitly activate an associate of that word. For example,

No abstract

Employing the federal Hate Crimes Prevention Act (HCPA) of 2009 and other such legislation as a backdrop, the present study evaluated the nature of beliefs about hate-crime legislation, offenders, and victims. In addition, it investigated construct validity (i.e., political beliefs and prejudice) and predictive validity (i.e., blame attribution and sentencing recommendations). A total of 403 U.S. adults completed measures of prejudice and an initial pool of 50 items forming the proposed Hate Crime Beliefs Scale (HCBS). Participants were randomly assigned to read one of four hate-crime vignettes, which varied in regard to type of prejudice (racial-, sexual orientation-, transgender-, and religion-based prejudices) and then responded to blame and sentencing questions. Factor analyses of the HCBS resulted in four sub-scales: Negative Views (i.e., higher scores reflect negative views of legislation and minority group protection), Offender Punishment (i.e., higher scores suggest endorsement of greater punishment), Deterrence (i.e., greater scores denote support for hate-crime legislation as a deterrent of more violence), and Victim Harm (i.e., higher scores reflect pro-victim attitudes). Greater pro-legislation and pro-victim beliefs were related to liberal political beliefs and less prejudicial attitudes, with some exceptions. Controlling for a number of demographic, situational, and attitudinal covariates, the Negative Views sub-scale displayed predictive utility, such that more negative views of legislation/minority group protection were associated with elevated victim blame, as well as lower perpetrator blame and sentencing recommendations. Results are discussed in the context of hate-crime research and policy, with additional implications considered for trial strategy, modern prejudice, and blame attribution theory.