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If militarism violates the ideals of liberty and justice in one way, and rapidly increasing social stratification violates them in another, then American democracy is in crisis. A culture of democratic accountability will survive only if citizens revive the concerns that animated the great reform movements of the past, from abolitionism to civil rights. It is crucial, when reasoning about practical matters, not only to admit how grave one's situation is, but also to resist despair. Therefore, the fate of democracy depends, to some significant degree, on how we choose to describe the crisis. Saying that we have already entered the new dark ages or a post-democratic era may prove to be a self-fulfilling prophecy, because anyone who accepts this message is apt to give up on the hard work of organizing and contestation that is needed to hold political representatives accountable to the people. This paper asks how one might strike the right balance between accuracy and hope in describing the democracy's current troubles. After saying what I mean by democracy and what I think the current threats to it are, I respond to Romand Coles's criticisms of reservations I have expressed before about rhetorical excess in the works of Stanley Hauerwas, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Richard Rorty. This leads to a discussion of several points raised against me by Hauerwas. A digression offers some of my reasons for doubting that John Howard Yoder's biblical scholarship vindicates Hauerwas's version of pacifism. The paper concludes by arguing that Sheldon Wolin's work on the evisceration of democracy, though admirably accurate in its treatment of the dangers posed by empire and capital, abandons the project of democratic accountability too quickly in favor of the romance of the fugitive.

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This paper is a rejoinder to papers by Kelsay on the author's recent book Democracy and Tradition. The argument covers a host of topics, ranging from epistemology and methodology to human rights, the common law, and Islamic ethics.IT IS A PLEASURE TO THANK EVERYONE WHO made possible the symposium on Democracy and Tradition (Stout 2004) at the University of Tennessee in the fall of 2004: Charles Reynolds, who came up with the idea in the first place and served as the principal organizer, the other members of the planning committee, the sponsors, those who presented papers and raised questions from the floor, and the editors of Soundings and the JRE. In thanking Charlie I am conscious of how many acts of generosity he has showered on me over the years. It all goes back to the time shortly after I completed my dissertation, when I submitted my first paper to this journal. Charlie, who was then the editor, initially consulted two referees, both of whom favored outright rejection. According to standard operating procedure, that would have been the end of the matter. Charlie, whom I had not yet met, gave the paper to a third reviewer, who recommended publication. Charlie then put one thumb on the scales, in the interest of providing a forum for an unheard voice, and offered to publish the paper if I revised it appropriately. The resulting article (Stout 1978) sets out some central elements of the pragmatism that I am still reformulating and defending.In the following remarks, I comment on six of the papers presented at the Knoxville symposium. I am grateful to the editors of this journal for allowing those papers and my rejoinder to be printed here, and to the authors for the generosity and care with which they have responded to my book. At some points the papers criticize my work in ways that demand either clearer articulation or substantive revision on my part. At other points the papers do not so much criticize my ideas as put them to JRE 33.4:709-744. C 2005 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc.

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