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After a decade of negotiation, countries adopted a new, legally binding agreement on climate change. Excitement for a new era in the climate regime is palpable among pundits and policy makers alike. But such enthusiasm largely overlooks that most of the Paris Agreement’s provisions represent continuity with existing climate policy, not a break with the past. This forum argues that the Paris Agreement is a dangerous form of incrementalism in two ways. First, it repackages existing rules that have already proven inadequate to reduce emissions and improve resilience. Second, state and nonstate actors celebrate the Agreement as a solution, conferring legitimacy on its rules; I suggest that, beyond the strong desire to avoid failure, developing countries and nongovernmental organizations accepted the Paris Agreement to secure the participation of the United States and to uphold previous agreements. Given the reification of existing rules, the ratchet-up mechanism and nonstate actors offer the last remaining hopes in global efforts to catalyze climate action on a scale necessary to safeguard the climate.

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Today's global climate movement is substantial and diverse. In the mid‐2000s, an influx of activists and organizations advancing social issues, such as gender, labor, justice, development and indigenous rights (to name a few) arrived at the UN climate negotiations, fragmenting civil society. I argue that, in part, the rise of these ‘new’ climate activists can be explained by the ongoing negotiations for a legally binding treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol, which added new issues that became ‘discursive hooks’ for NGOs’ claims to belonging in the climate regime. Linking to a specific institution had two effects: it served as an entry point to frame climate issues as social issues; and it helped NGOs carve a niche in climate policy in which they were authorities. In the Paris regime, this history matters, as some NGOs will fare better under the new rules than others. First, those established in institutions enshrined in the Paris Agreement will continue to have a foothold in the regime. Second, those that built their authority on their expertise or their capacity to deliver mitigation results may find more opportunities than those making moral claims.

After a decade-long search, countries finally agreed on a new climate treaty in 2015. The Paris Agreement has attracted attention both for overcoming years of gridlock and for its novel features. Here, we build on accounts explaining why states reached agreement, arguing that a deeper understanding requires a focus on institutional design. Ultimately, it was this agreement, with its specific provisions, that proved acceptable to states rather than other possible outcomes. Our account is multi-causal and draws methodological inspiration from the public policy and causes of war literatures. Specifically, we distinguish between background, intermediate, and proximate conditions and identify how they relate to one another, jointly producing the ultimate outcome we observe. Our analysis focuses especially on the role of scientific knowledge, non-state actor mobilization, institutional legacies, bargaining, and coalition-building in the final push for agreement. This case-based approach helps to understand the origins of Paris, but also offers a unique, historically grounded way to examine questions of institutional design.