Safe handling and storage of nuclear material at U.S. Department of Energy facilities relies on the use of robust containers to prevent container breaches and subsequent worker contamination and uptake. The U.S. Department of Energy has no uniform requirements for packaging and storage of nuclear materials other than those declared excess and packaged to DOE-STD-3013-2000. This report describes a methodology for prioritizing a large inventory of nuclear material containers so that the highest risk containers are repackaged first. The methodology utilizes expert judgment to assign respirable fractions and reactivity factors to accountable levels of nuclear material at Los Alamos National Laboratory. A relative risk factor is assigned to each nuclear material container based on a calculated dose to a worker due to a failed container barrier and a calculated probability of container failure based on material reactivity and container age. This risk-based methodology is being applied at LANL to repackage the highest risk materials first and, thus, accelerate the reduction of risk to nuclear material handlers.

Background When the Department of Energy ended the production of nuclear weapons in 1989 the focus of the weapons complex shifted from production to stabilization and remediation. At that time thousands of containers of plutonium-bearing liquids and solids that had been in the manufacturing pipeline needed to be processed and packaged for longer term safe storage. In 1994 and 2000, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) issued recommendations 94-1 and 00-1, respectively to accelerate and prioritize the stabilization and disposition of these materials.