This article discusses kinds of transformational giftedness, or giftedness that makes a positive, meaningful, and possibly enduring difference to the world. We extend previous work by suggesting that there are two kinds of transformation that matter: self-transformation and other-transformation. Combining these two kinds of transformation yields a 2 × 2 grid of four kinds of giftedness: non-transformational giftedness (no transformation), transformational giftedness (self- and other-transformation combined), self-realized giftedness (whereby one transforms oneself but not others), and other-realized giftedness (whereby one transforms others but not oneself). We open with a discussion of some of the history of conceptions of giftedness. Then we discuss transformational giftedness as it has been defined in the recent past. We then introduce our concepts of self- and other-transformation. We also describe two other kinds of giftedness—inert giftedness, which is giftedness in personal attributes that has not been realized in interactions with others and the world; and transactional giftedness, which is a give-and-take form of giftedness whereby one meets certain societal expectations in exchange for being identified as gifted. We finally conclude that the gifted movement needs to focus much more on developing transformational giftedness, or at least the potential for it, in our young people.

Criterion-referenced testing is usually applied to the assessment of achievement. In this article, we suggest how it can also be applied to the assessment of adaptive intelligence, that is, intelligence as adaptation to the environment. In the era of the Anthropocene, we argue that adaptive intelligence is what is most important not only for individual success, but also for success in terms of preservation of the world as we know it. We define criterion-referenced testing and compare it to norm-referenced testing. We then discuss two kinds of scoring of criterion-referenced testing, namely, with respect to external criteria and with respect to internal (theory-based) criteria. We then discuss past research on intelligence that could be viewed as criterion-referenced. Finally, we suggest how criterion-referencing could be applied to the assessment of adaptive intelligence.

How do people judge responsibility in collaborative tasks? Past work has proposed a number of metrics that people may use to attribute blame and credit to others, such as effort, competence, and force. Some theories consider only the produced effort or force (individuals are more responsible if they produce more effort or force), whereas others consider counterfactuals (individuals are more responsible if some alternative behavior on their or their collaborator's part could have altered the outcome). Across four experiments (N = 717), we found that participants’ judgments are best described by a model that considers both produced and counterfactual effort. This finding generalized to an independent validation data set (N = 99). Our results thus support a dual-factor theory of responsibility attribution in collaborative tasks.

No abstract