In this paper we examine information exchange networks in legislative politics and challenge the idea that legislators seek objective information prior to voting on bills. We make the intuitive claim that legislators establish contacts with each other that stand to maximize the value of the information they trade. Additionally, we make the counterintuitive claim that legislators seek information from sources that are predictably biased for or against their preferred outcomes. We test the propositions derived from this argument in the context of the European Parliament, using tools from social network analysis and modeling the network dependence using a multilevel approach. This research makes two primary contributions to the field of legislative politics. First, we demonstrate both theoretically and empirically how legislators use social contacts to their strategic advantage in their pursuit of legislative information. Second, our analytical approach demonstrates how to appropriately account for interdependence of observations in network data. 3The process of lawmaking is an inherently social exercise and scholars have recently begun to use social network analysis to help explain some legislative behaviors (see for example, Fowler 2006). However, it is not yet clear how social networks among lawmakers contribute to legislative outcomes, policy formation, or pivotal activities such as voting. This paper seeks to begin to fill this gap by examining social networks in legislative politics as circuits of information exchange. Specifically, we are interested in examining if legislative offices establish connections amongst each other that maximize the value of the information they trade.We maintain that in an effort to make well-informed policy choices, legislators have incentives to pursue information from sources that are predictably biased; the social connections they establish to collect information about the legislation they enact reflect these incentives. Information provided by sources that are predictably biased allows legislators to compare the information they expect to receive, given the known bias of the source, to the information they actually receive. This is of great value to legislators as they seek to confirm the appropriateness of the policy positions they are predisposed to take toward a given policy proposal. If the information legislators expect matches the actual information they receive, their predispositions are confirmed; in contrast, if the source provides information that deviates from their expectations it is likely to trigger a re-evaluation of their initial policy positions.Prior authors have noted the value of "biased" information for legislators (see Kingdon 1981, 232;Calvert 1985); however, we offer that information has greater value to decision-makers if it is predictably biased. Such information is either in support of or in opposition to the position a legislator is predisposed to take, which means that legislators ought to seek information from both political allies and ...

This paper is the result of a nationwide study of polling place dynamics in the 2016 presidential election. Research teams, recruited from local colleges and universities and located in twenty-eight election jurisdictions across the United States, observed and timed voters as they entered the queue at their respective polling places and then voted. We report results about four specific polling place operations and practices: the length of the check-in line, the number of voters leaving the check-in line once they have joined it, the time for a voter to check in to vote (i.e., verify voter’s identification and obtain a ballot), and the time to complete a ballot. Long lines, waiting times, and times to vote are closely related to time of day (mornings are busiest for polling places). We found the recent adoption of photographic voter identification (ID) requirements to have a disparate effect on the time to check in among white and nonwhite polling places. In majority-white polling places, scanning a voter’s driver’s license speeds up the check-in process. In majority nonwhite polling locations, the effect of strict voter ID requirements increases time to check in, albeit modestly.

This article challenges the existing state-of-knowledge about legislative caucuses by arguing that the caucus system reflects and reinforces formal organizing institutions, such as parties and committees, rather than counterbalancing them. We argue that legislators engage in the caucus system to maximize the social utility of their relationships. Using a social network framework, we develop and test hypotheses that seek to ascertain the types of legislators that assume elevated positions in the caucus network. We collect data on the complete population of caucuses and their members from the first session of the 110th U.S. House of Representatives and conduct social network analyses to find evidence that the caucus system supports the hierarchical structure of existing formal institutions.

This volume is meant to be a foundational resource on the study of networks in politics. This introductory chapter sets the stage for the chapters in this volume, which revolve around three central questions: What is political network analysis? How does it provide insight into important political phenomena? Why is it crucial for all political analysts to engage in network analysis? The opening argument is that networks are crucial for the study of politics and can bridge the micro-macro divide. After providing a brief history of the application of networks in political science, this chapter engages in a visual analysis of the development of the literature on political networks. This investigation shows the cross-cutting ties among academic subfields and highlights the central contributions to the literature. It also provides an overview of the chapters and concludes with the editors’ thoughts on the future of political network analysis.

Are professional lobbyists loyal partisans? There are thousands of professional lobbyists in Washington, D.C., who work with members of Congress and their staffs, many of whom also make contributions to congressional candidates and political parties. Although many lobbyists have backgrounds in partisan politics, they may have incentives to give money to candidates from both parties. This article finds that professional lobbyists tend to make personal contributions to their preferred party exclusively.