According to the “standard model” of accountability, holding another actor accountable entails sanctioning that actor if it fails to fulfill its obligations without a justification or excuse. Less powerful actors therefore cannot hold more powerful actors accountable, because they cannot sanction more powerful actors. Because inequality appears unlikely to disappear soon, there is a pressing need for “second‐best” forms of accountability: forms that are feasible under conditions of inequality, but deliver as many of the benefits of standard accountability as possible. This article describes a model of second‐best accountability that fits this description, which I call “surrogate accountability.” I argue that surrogate accountability can provide some of the benefits of standard accountability, but not others, that it should be evaluated according to different normative criteria than standard accountability, and that, while surrogate accountability has some benefits that standard accountability lacks, it is usually normatively inferior to standard accountability.

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The Armed Forces Health Surveillance Center, Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response System (AFHSC-GEIS) has the mission of performing surveillance for emerging infectious diseases that could affect the United States (U.S.) military. This mission is accomplished by orchestrating a global portfolio of surveillance projects, capacity-building efforts, outbreak investigations and training exercises. In 2009, this portfolio involved 39 funded partners, impacting 92 countries. This article discusses the current biosurveillance landscape, programmatic details of organization and implementation, and key contributions to force health protection and global public health in 2009.

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Abstract:The straightforward normative importance of emergencies suggests that empirically engaged political theorists and philosophers should study them. Indeed, many have done so. In this essay, however, I argue that scholars interested in the political and/or moral dimensions of large-scale emergencies should shift their focus from emergencies to emergency claims. Building on Michael Saward’s model of a “representative claim,” I develop an account of an emergency claim as a claim that a particular (kind of) situation is an emergency, made by particular actors against particular background conditions to particular audiences, which in turn accept, ignore, or reject that claim. Emergency politics, in turn, consists of many different actors making and not making, accepting, and rejecting, a wide range of overlapping and competing emergency claims. I argue that scholars should shift their focus to emergency claims because doing so helps us see the fraught implications of emergency politics for marginalized groups. I examine three such implications: emergency claims are often “Janus-faced,” meaning that they function simultaneously as “weapons of the weak” and weapons of the strong; they are often regressive, including by discriminating against victims of chronic bad situations, and they often perpetuate and exacerbate existing social hierarchies. Noticing these troubling features of emergency politics raises a question that I do not address here: What might plausible alternatives to emergency politics look like?