The so-called geoeconomic turn stands for the increased tendency of countries to use economic policy instruments to promote or defend national interests vis-à-vis trading partners or rival powers. Scholars note a similar shift in trade and investment policies of the European Union (“EU”). However, there are few studies that examine whether this proclaimed shift at the policy level is reflected in outcomes. Against this background, this chapter examines the EU’s ability to position itself as a defensive geoeconomic actor. Based on three exploratory case studies—investment screening, Most-Favoured Nations clauses in Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”), and the EU’s (non-)response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”)—we find that the EU’s ability to act in line with its own geoeconomic ambitions varies across the policy initiatives studied. In particular, lack of alignment of individual EU Member States with a common EU policy stance serves as a possible challenge for implementing defensive geoeconomic policies. At the same time, we also find that that the EU’s own framing of what makes a policy initiative “geoeconomic” varies widely, and does not always correspond to the legal design or economic implications of a given initiative. These findings contribute to debates on the EU’s evolving relevance as a global actor and shed new light on recent conceptualizations of the geoeconomic turn.

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5 Ibid. Indeed, the very concepts of BIT and ISDS are in a historical perspective European legal innovations, pioneered by Germany in 1959 and Italy in 1969, respectively, which over the following decades became truly global standards. See A. Newcombe and L. Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment (Kluwer Law International 2009) p. 42 at p. 45. 6 There are currently 194 intra-EU BITs in force (and one-Italy-Malta BIT of 2002that has not entered into force), all of which were entered into prior to the EU accession of one of the parties, according to UNCTAD, Investment Policy Hub database, supra n. 4. All but two of these BITs (Germany-Greece BIT of 1961 and Germany-Portugal BIT of 1980) involve a 'new' Member State (i.e. one that acceded in 2004 or later) as one of the parties. However, not all those BITs have been concluded between 'new' and 'old' Member States. In fact, while 138 of the intra-EU BITs are indeed between a 'new' and an 'old' Member State, fully 54 of them are between two 'new' Member States (id.). In addition, all Member States, except Italy, are, together with the EU itself, contracting parties to the Energy Charter Treaty, signed on 17 December 1994, 2080 UNTS 95, which contains multilateral investment treaty provisions. Italy was an original signatory of, and ratified, the Energy Charter Treaty, but notified its withdrawal from treaty in 2014 with effect from 1 January 2016. Like the Netherlands-Slovakia BIT, the Energy Charter Treaty and the other intra-EU BITs provide, with few exceptions, for ISDS and include ISDS clauses similar to that in the BIT at issue (ibid).

In seeking fresh ideas for twenty-first century WMD arms control and disarmament, there is value in looking at other regimes for tools and approaches that could be adapted and developed to enhance compliance and enforcement in contemporary WMD-related regimes. To this end, this report comprises a series of short essays that outline tools for treaty compliance or enforcement from regimes dealing with the environment, public health, small arms, international trade, and core international crimes.

In light of the limited possibility to seek legal recourse against screening of foreign investments on grounds of national security, can insurance provide an alternative avenue to compensate affected investors? The answer is: Yes, but with caveats. For investors, even if insurance does not provide an equivalent to full reparation, it can serve as a useful mitigant of the risk that contemplated investment transactions cannot be consummated as anticipated due to screening measures. For host States, insurance provides a useful mechanism by which they can facilitate compensation of investors without having to disclose information contrary to their essential security interests and thus a means by which host States can remain attractive to foreign direct investment in spite of investment screening.