Modern safety-critical systems rely heavily on robust communication channels. Even though these communication channels can be protected by Error Detection and Correction Codes, vulnerabilities caused by False Negatives still exist. These False Negatives can be caused by harsh electromagnetic disruptions and are detriment to overall safety. This paper considers the construction and structure of Triplication-based Error Correction Codes to find the most EMI-resilient code. Each code is tested and simulated in terms of the occurrence rate of False Negatives under single-frequency disturbances. It is found that a code with inversion is significantly more robust to these disturbances. Furthermore, a systematic fault injection is also performed to search for vulnerabilities within the code itself. The systematic approach allows us to reverse-engineer the expected vulnerabilities to real-world disturbances.

No abstract

No abstract

Today, embedded systems are being used in many (safetycritical) applications. However, due to their decreasing feature size and supply voltage, such systems are more susceptible to external disturbances such as electromagnetic interference. These external disturbances are able to introduce bit-flips inside the microcontroller's hardware. In turn, these bit-flips may also corrupt the software. A possible software corruption is a control flow error. This paper proposes a new softwareimplemented control flow error detection technique. The advantage of our technique, called Random Additive Control Flow Error Detection, is a high detection ratio with a low execution time overhead. Most control flow errors are detected, while having a lower execution time overhead than the considered existing techniques.

No abstract