Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractWe set up a two-country general equilibrium model, in which heterogeneous firms from one country (the source country) can offshore routine tasks to a low-wage host country. The most productive firms self-select into offshoring, and the impact on welfare in the source country can be positive or negative, depending on the share of firms engaged in offshoring. Each firm is run by an entrepreneur, and inequality between entrepreneurs and workers as well as intra-group inequality among entrepreneurs is higher with offshoring than in autarky.All results hold in a model extension with firm-level rent sharing, which results in aggregate unemployment. In this extended model, offshoring furthermore has non-monotonic effects on unemployment and intra-group inequality among workers. The paper also offers a calibration exercise to quantify the effects of offshoring.JEL-Classification: F12, F16, F23

This article identifies a “border” effect in the absence of a border. The finding that trade between east and west Japan is 23.1% to 51.3% lower than trade within both country parts is established despite the absence of an obvious east–west division due to historical borders, cultural differences, or past civil wars. Postwar agglomeration processes, reflected by the contemporaneous structure of Japan's business and social networks, instead of cultural differences, induced by long‐lasting historical shocks, are identified as an explanation for the east–west bias in intra‐Japanese trade.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Jens Wrona * * * Terms of use: Documents in University of TübingenNovember 13, 2013 AbstractWe offer a theoretical explanation and empirical evidence for a positive link between increased offshoring and individual skill upgrading. Skill upgrading takes the form of on-thejob training, complementing the existing literature, which mainly focuses on the retraining of workers after a direct job displacement through offshoring. To establish a link between offshoring and on-the-job training, we introduce an individual skill upgrading margin into the small-open-economy version of the Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) model of offshoring. In our model offshoring, by scaling up workers' wages, creates previously unexploited skill upgrading possibilities and, thus, leads to more on-the-job training. Using data from German manufacturing, we find strong empirical support for the prediction that increased offshoring is positively related to individual on-the-job training participation. JEL-Classification: F10, F16, F61

We develop a model of international trade with heterogeneous firms and monopsonistically competitive labour markets. We show that due to monopsonistic competition our model makes sharply different predictions about the effects of the export of goods and the offshoring of tasks. Trade in goods is unambiguously welfare increasing since domestic resources are reallocated to large firms with high productivity, and firms with low productivities exit the market thereby reducing the monopsony distortion present in autarky. Offshoring on the other hand gives firms additional scope for exercising monopsony power by reducing their domestic size and therefore can lead to welfare losses.

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