This article develops a computational framework to analyze dynamic auctions and uses it to investigate the impact of information sharing among bidders. We show that allowing for the dynamics implicit in many auction environments enables the emergence of equilibrium states that can only be reached when firms are responding to dynamic incentives. The impact of information sharing depends on the extent of dynamics and provides support for the claim that information sharing, even of strategically important data, need not be welfare reducing. Our methodological contribution is to show how to adapt the experience‐based equilibrium concept to a dynamic auction environment and to provide an implementable boundary‐consistency condition that mitigates the extent of multiple equilibria.

The authors reviewed the research literature evaluating the effectiveness of vocational counseling interventions focused on employment for consumers with substance use disorders. This review included 11 articles related to vocational counseling interventions, which are either incorporated with substance use treatment or not. The results of this review revealed that vocational counseling services have been highly efficacious in resulting in part-time and full-time jobs. The study designs had some limitations, and few studies employed randomized control trials (RCT).

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We would like to thank numerous seminar audiences for their comments and questions. El Hadi Caoui provided excellent research assistance. Financial Assistance from the US-Israel Binational Science Foundation is greatly appreciated. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

This article investigates the role of demand uncertainty in explaining cyclical investment fluctuations in the container shipping industry. I develop and estimate a dynamic oligopoly model with learning in which firms choose investment and scrapping. In this model, firms are uncertain about the true parameters in the underlying process for demand, and form and revise their beliefs using available information. Counterfactual analysis reveals that uncertainty about the demand process amplifies investment cycles through (i) leading firms to revise beliefs more drastically as they experience demand fluctuations, and (ii) intensifying strategic incentives among firms.