Prior research (e.g., Dechow, Huson, and Sloan ) documents that, on average, compensation practices appear to shield CEO pay from income‐decreasing special items. In some circumstances, compensation shielding can be efficient. For example, it may encourage CEOs with earnings‐sensitive pay to take an action that reduces current earnings but nevertheless enhances value. Compensation shielding can be inefficient in other circumstances, such as when a board of directors is captured by an overly powerful CEO or the magnitude of negative special items has been overstated (e.g., by shifting core expenses into special items). This paper explores whether strong governance can explain cross‐sectional variation in compensation shielding, and whether stronger governance and auditing are associated with less shifting of expenses. We find that strong corporate governance mechanisms, as captured by board (and committee) independence, the Sarbanes‐Oxley (2002) Act (SOX) and its related governance reforms, and switches to Big 4 auditors, are all associated with less compensation shielding. While our evidence suggests that strong overall governance is associated with a reduction in manipulation of core earnings through classification shifting in the cross‐section, we find inconclusive evidence to suggest that board independence or SOX influence classification shifting.

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This article regresses the market value of equity on pre-depreciation income and on depreciation expense for capital-intensive firms, referring to the coefficients from our model as valuation weights. The valuation weight on depreciation expense versus the weight on pre-depreciation income are compared, to detect depreciation biases, over time and across sectors. Our model shows that the valuation weights on depreciation expense change over time, if the persistence of the cash flow components of net income varies over time and if the accrual for depreciation is inflexible (e.g., straight-line depreciation). For Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), we find the valuation weight on pre-depreciation income increases with industry upturns, while the valuation weight on depreciation expense decreases during upturns. This result is contrasted to the nearly equal valuation weights for the cash flow and depreciation components of earnings for Resource firms (e.g., mines) over time. We conjecture this is because depletion accounting flexibly allows for “depreciation” to exhibit less bias than in other sectors. In summary, actual depreciation practices influence time variation in the valuation of depreciation, a point which has been underappreciated in prior studies.

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