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It has been noted that prior to the introduction of public procurement reforms, Zimbabwe’s procurement system was centralised, vulnerable to corruption, inefficient and bureaucratic. In 2018, the new decentralized public procurement reforms were introduced to address the shortcomings of the previous procurement regime by giving procurement powers to procuring entities. The aim of this paper is to highlight the implications of the reforms in implementation by rural local authorities in Zimbabwe. This paper adopted a qualitative research design with desktop approach being used to review related literature. The findings reveal that the plethora of reforms are a welcome development in public procurement. It has also been noted that there are many challenges militating against rural local authorities’ propensity to implement the new set of reforms. These challenges affect the ability of rural local authorities to deliver services timeously to communities thereby retarding realization of sustainable development in rural areas in Zimbabwe.

Devolution, which was incorporated into the Constitution of Zimbabwe through section 264, is a new phenomenon in Zimbabwe. This incorporation came about because of the need for participatory governance and the devolution of power away from the centre. Over the years, local governance has been informed by a plethora of pieces of legislation that do not provide an enabling environment for citizen participation, giving Zimbabwe’s local government a chequered history that excludes citizens from participating in public affairs that affect their lives. An analysis of section 264 of the Constitution revealed that devolution has the propensity to enhance transparency, efficiency and effectiveness as well as the fulfilment of central government’s responsibilities at provincial and local levels. This article argues that the belated implementation of the devolution of power has delayed improved service delivery, effectiveness, efficiency and accountability within local governance. This article further seeks to explain how the implementation of section 264 of the Constitution can bring about good local governance.

Following its victory in the 2013 elections held on 31 July, the ruling ZANU-PF party went about crafting a new economic blueprint, the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio- Economic Transformation (ZimAsset). The blueprint intended to bring about accelerated economic growth and wealth creation in Zimbabwe between October 2013 and December 2018. ZimAsset has four strategic clusters, namely Social Services and Poverty Reduction, Food Security and Nutrition, Infrastructure and Public Utilities `as well as Value Addition and Beneficiation. These clusters are regarded as the basis on which the objectives of the blueprint are anchored as well as the drivers of the development policy. This article provides a critical analysis of this blueprint by taking a historical look at the economic policy of the country and hastens to argue that this country has never been short of blueprints. What has been lacking is the implementation; owing to lack of resources, political will and corruption, among other factors. The economic policy is also bereft of an investment strategy, making it difficult to leverage on the country’s mineral resources. The Indigenization and Economic Empowerment Act of 2008 is not doing the country’s efforts to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) any good because it is in actual fact, driving away potential investors. This article argues that given that ZimAsset’s implementation is premised on the availability of financial resources, which the country does not have, and that FDI is not trickling in, the blueprint is bound to fail. This economic blueprint is ambitious, as it aims to achieve almost everything within a five-year period; and yet the country is thin on resources. Therefore, the blueprint will most likely, not be able to take Zimbabweans out of their economic quagmire.