This article is concerned largely with truth, lies and disinformation about the US war on terror across the Sahara-Sahel region of Africa. These are terms that have strong resonances but which soon take us into tricky philosophical terrain in which multiple definitions are embedded in numerous and widely contested theories of truth. As social scientists, we appreciate that truth is more about perceptions and social constructs than absolutes. In the postmodernist age, and especially in the context of the power structures with which we are dealingwhat Foucault (1980) preferred to call "regimes of truth" -my usage of the concept of 'alternative' or 'competing' truths might be taken to suggest that all narratives are somehow equal. I should therefore make absolutely clear that the narratives discussed in this article are not equal. The burden of proof for someone claiming that something happened is much higher than for those claiming it did not. In the case of the events that I recount here, that burden of proof lies firmly with the US and Algerian authorities and their respective intelligence services. The onus is on them to produce the metaphorical bodies to support their claims, which, so far, and as I argue below, they have singularly failed to do.In 2002-2003 the US, in collusion with its new regional ally Algeria, launched what has generally become known as a 'new' or 'second' front in its global war on terror across the Sahara and Sahelian regions of Africa. The precise nature of this Saharan war on terror, the intelligence on which it was based, the motives of the US and Algerian governments in various stages of its pursuance, its local, regional and global implications, and what would now appear to be its collapse, have been shrouded in opacity, dissemblance and obfuscation. That is not at all surprising in the light of the fact that senior members of the US administration, including the president himself, are on record as saying that disinformation is a legitimate weapon in its post-9/11 war on terror.The aim of this article is to separate the disinformation from the truth, and to explain the motives of the two main parties involved, namely the US and Algeria, in launching this new front. The article is in six parts. Part 1 gives a summary and largely descriptive account of the Saharan war on terror, which has been described,

While portrayed by the US as the rationalisation of its post‐Cold War global military command structure, AFRICOM is revealed as the culmination of a ten‐year thought process within the US Department of Defense, during which time Africa's strategic importance to the US has undergone several reappraisals as a result of the US's increasing need to secure African resources, notably oil; its global war on terror (GWOT) and China's growing investment on the continent. In the wake of 9/11, the US militarisation of Africa was justified in terms of its GWOT. However, this has become increasingly difficult as Africa, apart from the Maghreb and incidents in East Africa, has been relatively free of terrorism. Consequently, many of the ‘terrorist’ incidents in Africa, notably those in the western half of the Sahara‐Sahel, were either grossly exaggerated or fabricated. Far from bringing development and security to this part of Africa, as AFRICOM claims, the US's militarisation of this region over the last 5‐6 years (through its Pan‐Sahel Initiative, Trans‐Saharan Counter‐Terrorism Initiative and now AFRICOM) brought increased insecurity, repression, economic and social disruption, political destabilisation and ultimately armed rebellions to a hitherto relatively tranquil region. Since 2005‐6, the US has shifted its justification for the militarisation of the continent from the GWOT and counter‐terrorism to the more humanitarian security‐development discourse. This apparent paradigmatic shift, which presents AFRICOM as more benign than it really is, is part of the Bush administration's ‘information war’ and designed to mask the true purpose of Africom. The article explains the false premises on which the security‐development discourse is constructed, its serious consequences for the people of Africa and the implications that both this discourse and the way it is being used by AFRICOM have for anthropologists.

The article analyses the causes and implications of the ongoing Tuareg rebellions in Niger and Mali. While the larger and more widespread rebellion in Niger is generally attributed to the Niger Tuareg's demands for a greater and more equitable share of the country's uranium revenues, the article reveals that both rebellions, while centering on grievances associated with marginalisation, indigenous land rights and the exploitation of mineral resources, are far more complex. Other key elements are the continuing impact on the region of the global war on terror; competing imperialisms and subimperialisms; the associated interests of multinational mining companies; environmental threats and the interests of international drug-traffickers. The article also details the human rights abuses inflicted on the civilian populations in both Niger and Mali by the recently US-trained militaries.

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