J European Studies, xxm (1993), 371-407 Prmted m EnglandThe title of this article was chosen to indicate the beleaguered state of German universities in the Third Reich, under pressure to conform to the ideology and goals of the Nazi regime. However, an equally appropriate title might have been 'Treason in the Ivory Tower', a 'trahison des clercs' in Julien Benda's phrase.' For, arguably, the most striking feature of the history of universities in the Third Reich is the relative ease with which they adapted themselves to the new order. Indeed, many German academics -for a time at least -actually welcomed and eagerly co-operated with a movement and a regime which was blatantly at odds with the traditional values of their profession. This article seeks, first, to explain how this 'treason' occurred and then to examine the impact of the Nazi regime on the universities.At the time of Adolf Hitler's appointment as Reich Chancellor on 30 January 1933, German universities were seen by many academics as in crisis.2 2 In part, this was a result of the appalling economic depression which had begun in 1929.3 3 Mass unemployment encouraged many students to stay on at universities. However, this not only increased the overcrowding of universities -the total number of students in 1932/33 (92, 601) was 52.7% higher than the pre-war level -but also simply postponed the evil day, since on graduating these students could not find jobs appropriate to their qualifications. In the years 1930-33 the number of new graduates was between two and three times the number of graduate job vacancies.4 This army of Doktoren ohne Brot was a fertile breeding ground for disaffection with Weimar and, above all, it fuelled a generational conflict which exacerbated long-standing tensions within universities * I am grateful to Professor Michael Kater for commenting on an earlier version of this article and to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for financing the necessary research.

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This article examines the attempt by the political organization of the Nazi Party (PO) to find a role for itself following the establishment of the Third Reich. Some within the new administration argued that, having achieved power, the Party was now superfluous and its propaganda functions should be absorbed within the new Propaganda Ministry. During 1933–35, Hitler pursued a dual policy of restraining any revolutionary initiatives, while at the same time reassuring the Party that it had an important future role within the regime without precisely defining what that role should be. The Office of the F¸hrer’s Deputy under Rudolf Hess and his Chief of Staff, Martin Bormann, developed a concept of the PO’s role as Menschenführung, literally ‘leadership of people’, to provide them with the justification to intervene in all matters of state policy and action which affected ‘people’ and thereby to secure political leadership within the regime. This assertion was contested by the state authorities and by other party agencies, notably the SS, and was never fully achieved because of the polycratic nature of the regime. In practice, from 1936 onwards the PO’s role was primarily exercised at district and local level and took the form of the implementation of an alternative concept, ‘ supervision’ ( Betreuung) of the German people through propaganda, indoctrination and ideological and social control.

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