We review how the science of studying street protest has changed, identifying opportunities for innovation and collaboration.

was widely reported and analyzed. Yet accounts of the failure of these talks and the subsequent controversial talks in Taba, Egypt (21-27 January 2001) diverge widely in their descriptions of what transpired and in the attribution of blame for their failure. 1 Division of discourse about Camp David into dominant and revisionist narratives is inadequate. There is a tension between the goal of social science to reduce the complexity of social reality through the construction of parsimonious models and the need to refrain from oversimplification that significantly distorts reality. I hope that the interpretive approach applied in this essay more closely approximates the complexity of reality by complicating the model at the price of parsimony. 2 I employ a model that elucidates the differences between conflicting explanations for the failure of the summit negotiations at Camp David. No less important, I examine the internal divisions within the schools and areas of agreement between them, both of which have been insufficiently analyzed. This interpretation of positions and the evaluation of the role of culture offer a fuller understanding of the breakdown of the peace process and the "Labor Party-Arafat axis." 3

Social scientists treat stone-throwing as a non-violent act or argue that protest movements may be primarily non-violent despite stone-throwing. However, this study of an iconic example, the first intifada (Palestinian uprising, 1987–1993), demonstrates that stone-throwing is better characterized as unarmed violence. Definitions of violence underscore that throwing rocks is a violent act. Moreover, informed observers and data collected on stone-induced injuries during four years of the intifada illustrate the bodily harm caused by stones. The throwing of stones was central to the intifada and its identity and definition. Stone-throwing was the most visible tactic Palestinians used in the first intifada. Lastly, most scholars emphasize the protestors’ perceptions when it might be that the targets’ perceptions matter more for understanding definitions of (non-)violence and subsequent policy changes. These findings challenge important social science work and the mainstream Israeli and Palestinian narratives about the first intifada.

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