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This study uses integrated threat theory to examine Dutch adolescents’ (N =1,187) prejudice towards Muslim minorities. One out of two participants was found to have negative feelings towards Muslims. Perceived symbolic and realistic threat and negative stereotypes were examined as mediators between antecedent factors (in‐group identification, intergroup contact, and the endorsement of multiculturalism) and prejudice. Based on structural equation modelling, it was found that stereotypes and symbolic threats, but not realistic threats, predicted prejudice towards Muslims. Further, it was found that the effect of in‐group identification on prejudice was fully mediated by symbolic threat, the effect of contact was partially mediated by stereotypes, and the effect of the endorsement of multiculturalism was mediated by both symbolic threat and stereotypes. In addition, contact and multiculturalism were directly associated with prejudice towards Muslims. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.

This study applies multilevel social network analytic techniques to examine processes of homophilic selection and social influence related to alcohol use among friends in early adolescence. Participants included 3,041 Dutch youth (M age =12 years, 49% female) from 120 classrooms in 14 schools. Three waves with 3‐month intervals of friendship nomination data and self‐reports of drinking behavior were collected. Results revealed that within classrooms, friendship nominations tended to be reciprocated and dyadic friendships tended to be embedded within cohesive subgroups (e.g., cliques). Students tended to nominate friends who were the same sex, from a similar ethnic background, and who they previously knew from primary school. Selection processes turned out to play a more significant role than social influence processes in predicting similarity between early adolescent friends' alcohol use. Although friendship dynamics and individual drinking trajectories substantially differed between classrooms, the effects of homophilic selection and social influence did not.

Many interesting situations of public good provision such as a bystander's decision to help a victim, a committee member's decision to veto, or a company's decision to develop innovative products can be described by the volunteer's dilemma (VOD). The authors analyze a variant of the VOD in which the costs of producing a public good are shared equally among the volunteers rather than paid in full by each of the volunteers. The game theoretic solution predicts that the probability of volunteering is larger under the condition of sharing than when each volunteer pays the full cost. It is predicted that, even when cost sharing, the individual probability to volunteer decreases with group size, and larger groups still underproduce the public good. Predictions are tested using data collected via a mailed questionnaire to students of Berne University. The quantitative predictions of the game-theoretic models do not describe the data well, even when the models are extended with risk preferences. However, the less informative qualitative prediction that cost sharing increases the individual probability to volunteer is supported by the data.

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