In contemporary philosophy of law and political philosophy, relatively little pace is devoted to the problem of solidarity. In Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence and political philosophy, this concept barely makes an appearance. In the relevant European literature, including that in Polish, references usually have a historical focus, and deal with the sociological concepts of Emil Durkheim (the division into mechanical and organic solidarity) and Ferdinand Tönnies (the distinction of Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft), and their legal application by Leon Duguit (socialization of law as an expression of social soldarization). But if solidarity appears in contemporary philosophical-legal analyses, this is most frequently not expressis verbis, but in a manner that is concealed in one way or another by justice, especially in considerations of broadly conceived social justice.

The main purpose of this paper is the analysis of the notion "judicial disobedience”. The author describes two aspects (individual and institutional) and compare them with civil disobedience. The problem is presented in a paradigmatic manner upon the example of case law of American courts relating to slavery in the period of half of the century preceding the outbreak of the Civil War. Based on this, the author constructs a typology assuming four possible opinions of an adjudicating judge based on provisions of law, which are contrary to the judge’s conscience and morality. In this paper the problem is described upon the example of Justice Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from 1830 to 1860. However special attention is paid to his judgment in case Commonwealth v. Aves., but his another verdicts have been mentioned as well.

Filozofia prawa dotyczy takich tradycyjnych kwestii filozoficznych, jak ontologia, epistemologia, logika i etyka. Zwykle jednak nie uwzględnia ostatniego z głównych zagadnień filozoficznych ‒ estetyki. Autor próbuje wypełnić tę lukę tzw. estetyką pragmatyczną, sformułowaną przez Richarda Schustermana. Stosując terminologię łacińską, twierdzi, że lex (prawo) powinna być nie tylko certa, praevia, scripta et stricta, ale również pulchra (pewne, uprzednie, pisemne, ścisłe, ale również piękne). W artykule przedstawiono też trzy różne perspektywy związków prawa z estetyką. W podsumowaniu autor próbuje dokonać przykładowo estetycznej oceny systemu prawa jako całości, posiłkując się analizą obrazu Gustava Klimta Jurisprudenz.

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When does the universality of human rights and freedoms conflict with the legality of humanitarian intervention? This article explores the history of and problems with this issue. In addition, it pursues the problems of when and how to intervene to prevent humanitarian crises and how to reestablish peace after a military intervention. Three key responsibilities are identified: to prevent, to react, and to rebuild. This thorny ethical, political, and legal problem has been one of the most difficult in international law, and the author does not envision it being solved soon; however, the author points to real progress in multilateral conventions as hope for the future.