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Rapid development of the ride-sharing economy has led to a rising need to better understand travellers' decision making regarding their travel time and cost. The present study conducted a travel choice experiment using smartphone applications, based on data collected from 532 respondents and 2128 stated-preference surveys in China. Based on prospect theory, the experiment utilized a coupon reward policy to analyze how much ride-sharing platforms might influence travellers' choices in both work and leisure contexts. The results of an ordered logit model revealed that older residents were likely to pay more to reduce waiting time. It was further found that tourists had significantly higher probabilities to take expensive alternatives with shorter queueing time. The tourists' value of time was higher than that of residents, while the reward policy employed was found to increase the residents' value of time. Specific theoretical and managerial implications of the findings are discussed. Highlights. It conducted stated-preference surveys regarding travellers' ridesharing choices in China. The choice experiment employed four scenarios: rewarded residents, non-rewarded residents, rewarded tourists, and non-rewarded tourists. The logit model revealed older residents were likely to pay more to reduce waiting time. The tourists' value of time was higher than that of residents. The reward policy increased the residents' value of time, but not that of the tourists ARTICLE HISTORY

SUMMARY -Many cities around the world have introduced paid parking but implicitly subsidize parking for example by providing residential parking permits for street parking. We study the welfare effects of residential parking subsidies through changes in car ownership for Amsterdam. We employ a boundary-discontinuity design that exploits spatial variation in the length of waiting lists for permits and therefore in the size of the parking subsidy. In the city center, the waiting time for a permit is up to four years. Our results indicate that one additional year of waiting for a parking permit reduces car ownership with 2 percentage points corresponding to a price elasticity of car demand of −0.8. We demonstrate that subsidizing residential parking induces a substantial welfare loss. On average, a parking permit induces an annual deadweight loss of € 270.Furthermore, we show that the provision of parking permits is an income-regressive policy: rich households are five times more likely than poor households to receive these (implicit) parking subsidies.JEL-code -R20, R40, R42

Paid parking is the recommended policy tool by economists to deal with excess demand for street parking. However, we know very little about the effects of this policy on residents. This is particularly important in the context that residents have political power and usually vote against paid parking when it is detrimental to residents. Hence, in our analysis, we take into account that residents receive residential parking permits which provides political support for paid parking. We estimate the combined effect of a paid-parking parking policy-i.e. the introduction of paid parking and residential parking permits on residents-by examining its effect on house prices. We focus on Amsterdam and Utrecht using data over a period of 30 years. We do not find any effect of this paid-parking policy on house prices. This finding is consistent with the idea that residents only vote in favor of a local policy when it has no negative impact on their house prices.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. SUMMARY -Many cities around the world have introduced paid parking but implicitly subsidize parking for example by providing residential parking permits for street parking. We study the welfare effects of residential parking subsidies through changes in car ownership for Amsterdam. We employ a boundary-discontinuity design that exploits spatial variation in the length of waiting lists for permits and therefore in the size of the parking subsidy. In the city center, the waiting time for a permit is up to four years. Our results indicate that one additional year of waiting for a parking permit reduces car ownership with 2 percentage points corresponding to a price elasticity of car demand of −0.8. We demonstrate that subsidizing residential parking induces a substantial welfare loss. On average, a parking permit induces an annual deadweight loss of € 270. Terms of use: Documents inFurthermore, we show that the provision of parking permits is an income-regressive policy: rich households are five times more likely than poor households to receive these (implicit) parking subsidies.JEL-code -R20, R40, R42