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This article presents an overview of new evidence recovered from the former Indonesian Intelligence Agency's archives in Banda Aceh that is able to prove, for the first time, military agency behind the 1965-66 killings in Indonesia. The military leadership, these documents show, initiated and implemented the killings as part of a coordinated national campaign. This campaign was described by the military leadership as an "annihilation operation" and was implemented with the stated intention to "annihilate to the roots" the military's major political rival, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). This new evidence fundamentally changes what it is now possible to know about the 1965-66 killings, specifically as regards the question of military intent. Likewise, the process by which the military's target group was identified and targeted for destruction can now be understood using the military's own accounts of how this process occurred. This article argues that this new evidence strengthens the argument, advanced by genocide scholars since the early 1980s, that the 1965-66 killings should be understood as a case of genocide. ARTICLE HISTORY

This article provides an account of anti-Chinese violence in Aceh between 1 October 1965 and 17 August 1966. Drawing upon original oral history evidence and previously unknown documentary sources, this article builds upon current scholarly understandings that two phases of violence involving members of the ethnic Chinese community can be identified in Aceh during this period, to explain how a third explicitly ethnic-based phase of violence directed against members of the ethnic Chinese community in Aceh can also be identified. Based on this research and a reflection on the precedent set by the Cambodian genocide as to how the current legal definition of genocide can be applied, this article argues that the assessment that the Indonesian killings should not be understood as genocide is premature.

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