No abstract

When people are trying to determine whether an entity is capable of having certain kinds of mental states, they can think of it either from a functional standpoint or from a physical standpoint. We conducted a series of studies to determine how each of these standpoints impact people's mental state ascriptions. The results point to a striking difference between two kinds of states-those that involve phenomenal consciousness and those that do not. Specifically, it appears that ascriptions of states that involve phenomenal consciousness show a special sort of sensitivity to purely physical factors.

Introduction Itiswidelybelievedthatempathyisagoodthing,fromamoralpointofview.Itis something we should cultivate because it makes us better people. Perhaps that's true. But it is also sometimes suggested that empathy is somehow necessary for morality. That is the hypothesis I want to interrogate and challenge. Not only is therelittleevidencefortheclaimthatempathyisnecessary,thereisalsoreasonto think empathy can interfere with the ends of morality. A capacity for empathy mightmakeusbetterpeople,butplacingempathyatthecenterofourmorallives may be ill-advised. That is not to say that morality shouldn't centrally involve emotions.Ithinkemotionsareessentialformoraljudgmentandmoralmotivation (Prinz,2007).It'sjustthatempatheticemotionsarenotideallysuitedforthesejobs. Before embarking on this campaign against empathy, I want to say a little moreaboutthetargetoftheattack.Whatisempathy?Andwhatwoulditmeanto sayempathyisnecessaryformorality?Withrespecttothefirstquestion,muchhas been written. Theories of empathy abound. Batson et al. (1995: 1042) define empathyas,"asanother-orientedemotionalresponsecongruentwiththeperceived welfare of another person." This is not the definition I will be using. Batson's constructmightbebettercharacterizedas"concern,"becauseofitsfocusonanother person's welfare. Indeed, in much of his research he talks about "empathetic concern." Notice that this construct seems to be a combination of two separable things. Being concerned for someone is worrying about their welfare, which is something one can do even if one doesn't feel what it would be like to be in their place. One can have concern for a plant, for example, and an insect, or even an artifact,likeabeautifulbuildingthathasintodisrepair.Empathy,seemstoconnote a kind of feeling that has to be at last possible for the object of empathy. If so, "empatheticconcern"combinestwodifferentthings-afindoffeeling-foranobject andafeeling-on-behalf-ofanobject.Muchoftheempiricalliterature,includingthe superb research that Batson has done, fails to isolate these components, and, as a result,someoftheexistingstudiesareconfounded.Theypurporttoshowthevalue of empathy, but may really show the value of concern. My focus below will be on empathy,andIleaveitasanopenpossibilitythatconcernishighlyimportant,ifnot necessary,formorality.Indeed,concernoftenseemstoinvolveanelementkindof moralanger,whichIwillargueisveryimportanttomorality. It is also important to distinguish empathy from sympathy. Suppose I feel outragedforsomeonewhohasbeenbrainwashedintothinkingsheshouldfollowa cult leader who is urging mass suicide. That would not necessarily qualify as empathy.AsDarwall(1998:261)pointsout,sympathyisathird-personemotional response,whereasempathyinvolvesputtingoneselfinanotherperson'sshoes.But

Empathy can be characterized as a vicarious emotion that one person experiences when reflecting on the emotion of another. So characterized, empathy is sometimes regarded as a precondition on moral judgment. This seems to have been Hume's view. I review various ways in which empathy might be regarded as a precondition and argue against each of them: empathy is not a component, a necessary cause, a reliable epistemic guide, a foundation for justification, or the motivating force behind our moral judgments. In fact, empathy is prone to biases that render it potentially harmful. Another construct—concern—fares somewhat better, but it is also of limited use. I argue that, instead of empathy, moral judgments involve emotions such as anger, disgust, guilt, and admiration. These, not empathy, provide the sentimental foundation for morality.