Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to conceptually develop the understanding of co-opetition dynamics and to enhance the conceptual clarity of co-opetition by developing a definition based on previous research efforts. Design/methodology/approach -This conceptual paper integrates various approaches to the concept co-opetition into a definition that holds for co-opetitive interactions across multiple levels. Different co-opetitive interactions and the resulting dynamics are discussed by drawing upon competition and cooperation theories. The paper concludes with an agenda for further research on co-opetition dynamics. Findings -The paper outlines how different types of co-opetitive interactions result in archetypical situations where the dynamics of co-opetition are present as well as where the dynamics of co-opetition are missing due to a lack of balance between cooperation and competition. It notes four co-opetitive forces: over-embedding, distancing, confronting, and colluding. These four forces drive development towards situations without dynamics. Originality/value -This paper provides a conceptual understanding of co-opetition dynamics and will reveal that in order to adequately account for co-opetition dynamics, a definition of co-opetition must analytically separate the cooperative and the competitive interaction inherent in co-opetition.

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Contemporary agricultural practices account for a significant share of greenhouse gas emissions. Inspired by the emergent literature on institutional entrepreneurship, we seek to explore mechanisms that affect an actor's propensity to act in ways that imply suggesting and promoting emissionreducing practice changes. As influences with origin external to the organizational field are assumed to constitute such mechanisms, the paper explores their role through a case study of a project run by a public agency. Unlike extant theory, results show that the agency's propensity to act is not necessarily enhanced by extra-field influences but that such influences also limit the scope for suggesting change that challenge existing industrial practices.

To overcome resource shortages, companies can subscribe to groups that, in competition with other groups, seek to obtain external funding for the joint development of innovations. In this context, the authors argue smaller groups are better equipped to be successful in external funding campaigns. Based on five-year panel data from a sample of 53 Swedish groups of small and medium-sized companies, the authors find support for a claim suggesting that due to the adverse effect of group size on governance and internal cohesion, the costs associated with group size will outweigh benefits, which reduce the ability to compete for external funding. Consistent with their expectations, the authors find that the adverse effect of group size on fundraising effectiveness is mitigated by internal and external governance devices including the presence of external directors on the group board and interlocking board memberships, and by a bottom-up group formation process.